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ABSTRACT 
Income Tax in South Africa is levied in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 on 
taxable income, which, by definition, is arrived at by deducting from ''gross income" 
receipts and accruals that are exempt from tax as well as deductions and allowances 
provided for in the Act. The Income Tax Act provides no guidance with regard to the 
taxation of illegal activities, except to prohibit the deduction of expenditure incurred in 
paying fines or in relation to corrupt activities, as defined. An analysis of the taxation of 
income derived from theft, fraud and prostitution and the deductibility of expenses 
relating to that income, is the question addressed in this thesis. In this thesis, an analysis 
was made of relevant case law in relation to the provisions of the Income Tax Act in an 
attempt to provide clarity. A brief comparison was also macie of American, United 
- c.. 
Kingdom and South African tax law. Similarities were found between the American, 
United Kingdom and South African tax regimes in relation to the taxation of income, but 
there appeared to be more certainty in America and the United Kingdom in relation to the 
deduction of expenses. The thesis concludes that recent case decisions have provided 
certainty in relation to income from illegal activities, but the tax status of the deduction of 
expenses remains uncertain. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 CONTEXT 
By taxing proceeds from illegal activities the State would be keeping its revenue eye open 
and its eye of justice closed l . The Sunday Times2 reported that the ..united Nations 
recognises a world-wide growth of the shadow economy which includes the trade in stolen 
goods, illegal drug manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, fraud, etc. As this shadow 
economy grows the question is whether or not profits from this economy are taxable. 
The South African Revenue Services (to be referred to as SARS) is entrusted with a duty 
to collect taxes and to do so it is guided by the Income Tax Act3 (hereinafter referred to as 
"the. Income Tax Act"). The taxing statute targets a wide range of activities, without 
having regard to the legality of the activity that gave rise to income. A question to be 
asked at this point is whether or not the State should refrain from taxing illegal activities 
because to tax would amount to legitimising the iIlegitimate4. Taxing income from ilkgal 
activities invites a debate concerning whether the taxpayer should be entitled to a 
deduction of any expenditure incurred in producing income from illegal activities. If 
delinquent taxpayers are not taxed, the question of equal treatment of taxpayers arises and 
if they are not allowed deductions the same question arises. It has been argued that by 
taxing such illegal activities SARS is not necessarily condoning them5. SARS has not been· 
involved in the commission of the illegal activity; it merely recognises income derived 
from what appears to be a trade, and the Revenue laws provide for the 'taxation of income 
from trades6. There is an argument, where income received illegally is concerned, that it 
I Mann v Nash (H M In.§pector of Taxes) [1932] 1 KB 752 
2 Sheve1 'Huge tax orgy in sex industry' 2006 Sunday Times 12 February: 4. 
3 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended 
4 Monteiro and Bonthuys 'Sex for sale: the prostitute as businesswoman' (2007) [On line]. Available: 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/workshop/workshop03/WWLSBonthuvsandM onteiro .doc . [Accessed 
20106/2007] 
5 Mann v Nash (H M Inspector of Taxes) [J932} I KB 752 
6 Mann v Nash (H M Inspector of Taxes) [I932} I KB 752 
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would be preferable for tax law to stand aloof and attach no tax consequences to the 
income and let the whole matter be dealt with in terms of criminallaw7 . 
-:; r 
This thesis will demonstrate that income from illegal activities is subject to tax, but there 
is some doubt whether expenses incurred in generating that income would be deductible. 
An open question is whether considerations of public policy shouldrdellY a person 
involved in illegal activities the deduction of the expenses they incur in deriving their 
illegal income. Revenue laws should tax the economic gain derived by the taxpayer by 
allowing the taxpayer to reduce his or her taxable income by the cost of earning the 
income8. Thus, if tax law is looked at in isolation, the ideal outcome would be to include 
the proceeds from illegal activities in the gross income, while the allowing the perpetrator 
to claim the deductions to which he or she would have been entitled, had he or she been an 
'honest' trader9. A legal system is made up of a body of laws that deal with different 
issues but at the same time they all have the same purpose. The rationale behind the denial 
of deductions is that government should not allow wrongctoers to benefit from their -
misdeeds through the tax lawlO. However, tax law is designed to collect revenue·and 
criminal law is designed to punish wrongdoers. Tax law should therefore be neutral and 
provide for the taxation of the income and the deduction of expenditure incurred in 
earning such income. Being neutral entails taxing income if it meets the requirements of 
income and allowing a deduction if it meets the requirements of a deduction. 
Deductions may be disallowed on the basis that the taxpayer was involved in disapproved 
activities II. Tax is not levied on gross income but on the taxable income of the taxpayer, 
after the deduction of qualifying expenditure. Disallowing expenditure incurred in the 
7 PricewaterhouseCoopers 'The taxability of illegal pyramid schemes' 2007 Synopsis at 2-3 
Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 274 
-" 
Monteiro and Bonthuys 'Sex for sale: the prostitute as businesswoman' (2007) [On line]. Available: 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.zalworkshop/workshop03/WWLSBonthuysandMonteiro .doc. [Accessed 
2010612007] 
10 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 275 
II CoIliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 277 
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production of income would mean that, for some taxpayers, tax is levied on their gross 
income. The denial of deductions is not consistent with the idea of taxing income after 
deductions because, if deductions are disallowed then gross income will be taxed 12 . By 
refusing deductions, tax law is punishing people for disapproved activities by denying the 
benefits that would be available for inoffensive business expenses13 . In a legal system 
there are many branches of law that discourage certain behaviour, but tax1aw is designed 
to be a neutral body of financial rules for revenue collection and, other than revenue 
crimes, tax law leaves punishment for bad behaviour to other branches of law14 . Denial of 
deductions punishes taxpayers for non-revenue crimes and this is inconsistent with a 
neutral structure 1 5 • The main objective of tax law is to collect revenue by taxing a 
taxpayer's net income, not to reform his or her character, so that tax law should not be used 
to punish taxpayers for their non-revenue crimes. Bootie J, in Dixie Machine Welding16 
held- that tax law should take taxpayers as they are by taxing them and leaving their 
punishment to other branches of law that are tasked and trained to punish, and also that tax 
..... - -:.;,.."-
law should not be used to extirpate evil or for the espousal of public policy. DeMattei17 
argues that the motive for involvement in illegal activities is the profit so derived, thus if 
the profit is taxed, it decreases the lucrative nature of such activities. The role of taxation 
in such cases would be to deprive organised crime of substantial amounts of money. 
Refusing certain taxpayers the deduction of expenditure incurred in the production of their 
income leads to a differing treatment of taxpayers in that certain taxpayers are taxed on 
their taxable income (after deducting qualifying expenses), while those deriving their 
12 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 277 
13 Colliton 'The Tax Tr~atment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 278 
14 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 280 
15 ColIiton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 280 
16 Dixie Machine Welding and Metal Works, Inc v United States 315 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963) 
17 DeMattei "The Use of Taxation to Control Organized Crime"(1951) California Law Review 39 (2): 226-
234 
8 
income from illegal activities are taxed on their gross Income. This treatment IS 
inequitable and unreasonable I8 . 
Ordering the restoration of the status quo, while denying the deduction of the cost of 
restoration, appears to amount to a form of double taxation. It is the principle of our law 
that a person cannot be convicted twice for the same offence. Section 35(3)(m) of the 
Constitution states that every accused person has a right not to be tried for an offence in 
respect of an act for which that person has previously been either acquitted or convicted. 
When the accused is required to plead he or she may plead that he has already been 
convicted of the offence with which he is charged, in terms of section 106(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act. In McIntyer v Pietersen19 it was held that this right protects an 
individual from being repeatedly prosecuted for the same conduct or offence. Tax law 
seeks to tax a taxpayer on his or her taxable income (gross income, less exempt income, 
less deductions) and if deductions are not granted this can be regarded as a penalty. If the 
- . ~ 
accused is criminally prosecuted as a result of disclosure of income for income tax 
purposes or when a civil claim is brought against him or her to restore the status quo; it is 
submitted that this would amount to punishing the accused twice. 
The question of double taxation may therefore arise where the criminal is taxed on his or 
her income from illegal activities, but denied the deduction of expenses and losses. 
incurred in deriving the income. The rule of law provides that laws must be certain and 
individuals are entitled to know thei~ rights and obligations in advance with certaint/o. 
The Constitution provides for the separation of powers between the executive, legislature 
and the judiciary. All three arms have different mandates and SARS forms part of the 
executive branch of government and is mandated with applying the laws made by the 
18 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 
273 at 274 
19 McJntyer v Pietersen 1998 (1) BCLR 18 (T). 
20 Bodlani" SA's tax laws inconsistent with the rule oflaw" Available: 
http://www.moneyweb.co.zalmw/view/mw/enlpage38?oid=62036& sn=Detail [Accessed 20106/2007]. 
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legislature. SARS should not be in a position to decide that tax is due where this is not 
unambiguously stated in law2l . 
Another problem that may arise, should the income from illegal activities be taxed, is the 
rights of the victim, if the perpetrator should become insolvent. When a person is declared 
insolvent his estate is wound up and creditors are paid. Before creditor's -claims can be 
satisfied, the free residue is first used to payor satisfy the claims of preference creditors, 
which are funeral expenses, death bed expenses, costs of sequestration, costs of execution, 
salaries for employees of the insolvent and income tax22 . After all these expenses are paid 
creditors are then paid according to their rank, secured creditors being at the top of the list 
and then concurrent creditors. Secured creditors are creditors who hold security for their 
claims and concurrent creditors on the other hand do not hold security for their claims and 
are entitled to be paid after all the claims of secured creditors have been satisfied23 . For 
Income Tax purposes, section 101 of the Insolvency Act yro~Ldes that the free residue 
shall be applied to the payment of any tax for which the insolvent was liable under any Act 
of Parliament in respect of any period prior to the date of sequestration of the insolvent's 
estate. 
In terms of the law of insolvency the Revenue Services are therefore one of the 
preferential creditors and even rank above secured creditors. This means that a holder of a 
judgement against the insolvent will only be paid his or her claim after the preferential 
creditors have been satisfied. It can be questioned whether it is fair to leyy tax in the hands 
of the thief in cases of insolvency, as there is little or no property for the effective grant in 
favour of the victim of the crime, of a spoliation order or the order granted in terms of 
section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Under section 300 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act, if there is no pf(~'perty to compensate, the judgement creditor has no other remedy as 
they would not be able to enforce a judgement again~t a judgement debtor with no funds 
21 Bodlani" SA's tax laws inconsistent with the rule oflaw" Available: 
http://www.moneyweb.co.zalmw/view/mw/enlpage38?oid=62036& sn=Detail [Accessed 20106/2007]. 
22 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, s 96-104. 
23 Sharrock, van der Linde and Smith Hockly's Insolvency Law 8 ed (2006) 168. 
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or property. This means that if thieves or persons committing fraud are taxed the fiscus 
always benefits and the victim is not guaranteed a remedy. Our law appears to tax the thief 
in these circumstances and enrich thefiscus at the expense of the victim. 
The revenue laws seek to tax even at the expense of the victim of crime and this makes 
remedies like a spoliation order and the remedy under section 300 af the Criminal 
Procedure Act incompetent to cater for the rights of the victims. The purpose of these 
remedies is to restore the status quo and if the perpetrator is indigent or insolvent, the 
fiscus will claim what is due to it and only if there is any property remaining will other 
creditors and the judgement creditor get to be paid all or part of their claims. The question 
posed should possibly be: Is it constitutional to tax at the expense of victims? 
The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services is responsible for carrying out 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act in terms of section 2 and for levying tax on a 
taxpayer's taxable income as provided for by section 5. S-outl:tAfrican law as it stands 
requires the status quo to be restored when a spoliation order or a remedy in terms.{)f 
.. -
section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act is sought. This implies that the defendant or 
accused will have to refund the whole amount, not taking into account the fact that he or 
she has paid tax on it. It would appear that the income derived from illegal activities is 
subject to tax, but there is some doubt whether expenses incurred in producing the income 
would be deductible in arriving at taxable income. The person engaged in illegal activities 
would be taxed on income so derived, but may not be entitled to deduct either the 
expenses incurred or the compensation due to the victim. In effect, therefore, the 
compensation payable would have been subject to double tax - once when the illegally 
obtained proceeds are received and then by denying a tax deduction when the 
compensation is paid. 
Income tax, in terms of the Income Tax Act, is imposed on "taxable income" as defin~d24, 
which is arrived at as follows: 
24 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, s1 
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"Gross income,,25 
Less: Exempt income (sections 10 and lOA of the Income Tax Act) 
-:, r 
Equals: Income 
Less: Allowable deductions (Part I of Chapter II of the Income Tax Act) 
Plus: All amounts included or deemed to be included in the taxableinC"ome 
of any person in tenns of the Income Tax Act 
Equals: "Taxable income" 
None of the definitions or sections in the Income Tax Act which apply in arriving at the 
"taxable income" of a person make any reference to the taxability or non-taxability of 
income derived from illegal activities, except for section 23(0) which specifically prohibits 
the deduction of "any expenditure incurred where the payment of the expenditure or the 
agreement or offer to make that payment constitutes an acti~ity ~~ntemplated in Chapter 2 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004; or which 
constitutes a fine charged or a penalty imposed as a result of an unlawful activity .... "; 
As early as 1918, in CfR v De/agoa Bay Cigarette C026, it was held that the legality or 
illegality of the business which produced the income was irrelevant in relation to the 
liability for income tax. In fTC 119rj27, it was held that the tax collector has cast his net 
..... -
wide enough to catch all income so that once a receipt or accrual is held to constitute 
income it is taxable in tenns of the Income Tax Act, irrespective of whether it is legal or 
illegal income. The victims of certain crimes have the right to recover their property or 
claim restitution and this may affect the taxability of the illegal income or the timing of the 
taxation thereof. Nevertheless, the position in relation to income arising from illegal 
activities, provided it complies with all the requirements for inclusion in taxable income, 
appears to be relatively certain. It is submitted that' the position relating to allow~ble 
deductions is less certain, as public policy issues may prevent the deduction of expenses 
25 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, s1 
26 CfR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co 1918 TPD 391, 32 SATC 47 
27 fTC 1199 36 SATC 16 at 19 
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and other allowances in respect of income from illegal activities (refer to ITC 149028 - to 
be discussed in chapter 3). This thesis discusses the taxation of income from illegal 
activities and specifically amounts received or'RGcrued and deductions claimed in arriving 
at the taxable income from prostitution, theft and fraud. 
Any person who is liable for tax is required to furnish a return upon receivillg notice by 
the Commissioner29, containing such particulars as may be prescribed by the 
Commissioner. Despite the secrecy provisions contained in the Income Tax Aceo, the 
Commissioner may, under certain circumstances, disclose information to the National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service3 ]. The Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa32 (to be referred to as the Constitution), in section 35(1), stipulates that when 
persons are arrested they have a right to be informed about their rights and, most 
importantly, that what they say may be used against them in court and that they will not to 
be forced to make a confession. When taxpayers file tax returns, they are required to 
disclose fully information about their income. They are not info1-med that the information 
they provide may be used against them in court and they are also not assisted by anYJ~gal 
representative when making such disclosure. This aspect of the taxation of income from 
illegal activities will also be discussed in this thesis. 
The thesis also deals briefly with the taxation of income from illegal activities in the 
United States of America (referred to as the United States) and in the United Kingdom, in-
order to compare the principles applying in these jurisdictions with the situation in South 
Africa. 
The broad question to be addressed in this research is therefore whether the present basis 
of dealing with Income from illegal activities in terms of the Income Tax Act, IS 
appropriate. 
28 ITC 1490 53 SATe 108 
29 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s66 
30 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s4 
31 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 s4(1B) 
32 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
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1.2 THE OFFENCES 
There are different types of crime: crimes aga!n~t human life, crimes against family life, 
crimes against property, crimes against community interests, crimes against sexual 
morality, crimes against collective welfare, etc33 . Some of these crimes have victims and 
thus in a crime against property the property owner is the victim. Crimes against collective 
welfare include such crimes as bribery, corruption, substance abuse and road traffic 
offences. These crimes do not per se have victims. There are also different types of illegal 
income: certain types of income are derived from activities that are illegal and other types 
of income are from a legal source, but were derived in an illegal manner. An example of 
the latter would be a trader carrying on a lawful trade who then commits a crime in 
deriving part of his or her income for the year. 
Fraud is the unlawful making of a misrepresentation with intent to defraud, which causes 
actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another34 :- The intention required to 
be possessed by the perpetrator for this type of crime is the intention to defraud35• 1'heft, 
on the other hand, is an unlawful appropriation with the intent to steal a thing capable of 
being stolen36. The taking must be done without the owner's consent and the appropriation 
happens when the thief behaves as if he or she is the owner of such property and deals 
with it the wayan owner would37 • The Sexual Offences Aces provides that it is an offence 
for any person to have unlawful carnal intercourse, or commit an act of indecency with 
any other person for a reward. The Sexual Offences Act further prohibits the keeping of 
brothels, the procurement of females as prostitutes and knowingly living on the earnings 
of prostitution39. 
33 Burchell and Milton Principles a/Criminal Law (2004) 
34 Burchell and Milton Principles a/Criminal Law (2004) 833 
35 Burchell and Milton Principles 0/ Criminal Law (2004) 844 
36 Burchell and Milton Principles a/Criminal Law (2004) 782 
37 Burchell and Milton Principles a/Criminal Law (2004) 787 
38 Sexual Offences Act No 23 of 1957, s20(l)(aA) 
39 Sexual Offences Act, s20(1) (a) 
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1.3 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This research seeks to investigate the tax impli<c~tions of receipts and accruals, as well as 
expenses, relating to illegal activities, with a specific focus on fraud, theft and prostitution. 
The objectives of this research are 
• To analyse the taxability of the receipts and accruals derived from illegal activities, 
including the timing of a receipt and thus the time of levying taxation, given the 
remedies available to the victim of the crime. 
• To analyse the deductibility of expenses incurred in the production of income from 
illegal activities. 
• To do limited a comparative study of the taxation of income from illegal activities 
using United Kingdom legislation and legislation of the United States. 
1.4 SOURCES OF DATA AND THE RESltARCH 
APPROACH 
A qualitative analysis of documentary sources was carried out in order to investigate the 
taxation of income from illegal activities. 
Reference was made to the Income Tax Act, the Criminal Procedure Act, the Law of 
Evidence and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. The principle of the 
mandament van spolie and the remedy provided for in section 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act are relevant sources of data, as well as court decisions relating to all of the 
legislation and the writings of authoritative experts in the various areas. 
A limited comparative study was also made of South African and United Kingdom 
legislation and the legislation of the United States of America, as well as court decisions 
and the writings of experts in these jurisdictions. 
15 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis has been divided into five chapters. Chapter One serves as an introduction to 
the thesis. Chapter Two deals with the taxation of income in South Africa and investigates 
the taxability of income from illegal activities. Chapter Three investigates the deduction 
of expenditure incurred in the earning of income and particularly expenses.. incurred in 
generating income from illegal activities. Chapter Four focuses on a brief comparative 
study between South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom of the taxation of 
income from illegal activities and of expenditure incurred in the production of illegal 
income. Chapter Five summarises the conclusions reached. 
16 
CHAPTER 2: SUBJECTING INCOME FROM 
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES TO INCOME TAX IN SOUTH 
AFRICA - RECEIPTS AND A."CCRUALS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One described the context in which the research is situated, defined the offences 
of prostitution, theft and fraud, stated the objectives of the research, discussed the research 
methodology and briefly outlined the chapters to follow. The present chapter addresses 
the first research objective: the taxation of income from illegal activities. In doing so, the 
definition of "gross income,,4o is discussed in general terms and in relation to income from 
illegal activities. Because the victims of the crimes of theft and fraud have legal remedies 
against the criminals, the income from these activities may be contingent pending the 
reimbursement of the victims. This may have an impact on the taxation of such income. 
This chapter therefore discusses the remedies available to the victims. 
2.2 GROSS INCOME 
"Gross income,,41 
in relation to any year or period of assessment, means -
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or 
accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) in the case of a: person other thana resident, the total amount, -in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source 
within or deemed to be within the Republic, during such year or period of 
assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature" .. 
Gross income is the starting point for the levying of tax· because, for persons to be ta{(ed, 
they need to have taxable income on which their tax would be calculated. In other words, 
40 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, s 1 
41 Income Tax Act, sl 
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if a person does not have gross income he or she cannot be liable to pay tax42. Receipts or 
accruals which are capital in nature are excluded from the gross income definition, but the 
Income Tax Act further provides for certain receipts and accruals, which can be of capital 
nature, to be included in terms of paragraphs (a) to (n) of the gross income definition. The 
Income Tax Act does not define the terms used in the gross income definition and the 
judiciary, as interpreters of the law, have a duty to give meaning to SUCll terms. For the 
meaning of these terms as used in the Income Tax Act, reliance is placed on the meanings 
given to such terms by the courts, in cases that come before them. The gross income 
definition does not provide that a receipt or accrual must have been derived in the course 
of a legal pursuit in order to be included in a taxpayer's gross income, so this question has 
been left to the courts to decide43 . 
The ·case of CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette C044 dealt with income flowing from illegal 
activities. In this case the company was selling packets o( cig![ettes at an inflated price 
and placing a numbered coupon in each of these packets. Two-thirds of the selling price 
was set aside as a prize fund from which a monthly distribution was made.· Two:such 
distributions had been made and a third was pending, but criminal proceedings had been 
instituted on the grounds that the officials of the company were running a lottery. To 
prevent the payment of the prizes, thereby rendering the company unable to pay the tax, 
the Commissioner had issued an interim assessment based on the argument thattbe 
payment of the prize money was a disposal of profits after they had been earned. The 
company's counter-argument was that the prizes constituted an expense incurred in the 
production of income and not a disposal of· income after it had been earned, that the 
business of the company was illegal and that the State could therefore not levy taxes on 
the profits from illegal transactions. The court held that the payment of the prizes was 
made in terms of the contract under which the ci~arettes were sold and was not a 
42 Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 25th edition (2006) 2. 
43 Monteiro and Bonthuys 'Sex for sale: the prostitute as businesswoman' (2007) [On line]. Available: 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/workshop/workshop03/W W LS Bonth uysandMonteiro .doc. [Accessed 
20106/2007] 
44 CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co 1918 TPD 391, 32 SATe 47 
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distribution of income after the cigarettes were sold. The court also held that the 
Commissioner was not debarred in terms of the Act from demanding payment under an 
interim assessment to ensure the payment of tax that was due. It was held further that the 
legality or illegality of the business which produced the income was irrelevant to the 
liability for income tax. Bristowe, J stated this as follows45 
I do not think it is material for the purpose of this case whether the business carried on by 
the company is legal is illegal. Excess profits duty, like income tax, is leviable on all 
incomes exceeding the specified minimum ... The source of the income is immaterial. 
This was so held in Partridge v Mallandaine [18 QBD 276] where the profits of a betting 
business was held to be taxable to income tax; Denman J saying that 'even the fact of a 
vocation being unlawful could not be set up against the demand for income tax'. If the 
income itself is taxable, it follows I think that if the prizes had been a legitimate deduction 
. had the business been legal, they would equally be a legitimate deduction if the business is 
illegal. 
In ITC 119946, it was held that the tax collector has cast his net wide enough to catch-all 
income so that once a receipt or accrual is held to constitute income it is taxable in terms 
of the Income Tax Act, irrespective of whether it is legal or illegal income. 
It would appear, therefore, that provided a receipt or accrual of income from illegal 
activities meets all the requirements of the definition of "gross income", it will be included . 
in gross income and will be subject to income tax. 
Receipts and accruals from prostitution would include the amounts paid directly to a 
prostitute for his or her services, the receipts of a brothel-keeper who employs prostitutes 
to provide services to clients and the receipts of persons acting as "agents" for prostitutes 
-" 
who earn a fee for their procurement services or who' live on the earnings of prostitQtion. 
The gains of thieves would include either cash or property derived from theft and the 
perpetrators of fraud would obtain cash or property from their victims. 
45 Williams, R.c. Income Tax in South Africa: Cases and materials 2nd ed. (2005) 168 
46 ITC 1199 36 SATe 16 at 19 
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To be included in gross income, amounts derived from illegal activities would have to 
meet all the requirements of the definition. The definition and the related case law are 
discussed below. 
2.2.1 AMOUNT 
The gross income definition includes all amounts received by or accrued to the taxpayer. 
Amounts obtained from illegal activities may also have the quality of income and also 
satisfy the "received by" principle established in Geldenhuys v CIR47 that provides that a 
taxpayer receives money if he or she receives it on his or her own behalf and for his or her 
own benefit. 
The word 'amount' in the gross income definition does not only refer to money but also to 
the value of every form of property earned by the taxpayer, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, which has a money value48 . In CIR v Butcher Brothers (Pty) Ltd"9 it washeld 
that the word "amount ... must mean an amount having an ascertainable money value". If 
a taxpayer steals property or defrauds a victim of property, the value of such property will 
be the amount for tax purposes. In CIR v Delfos50 it was held that if an amount "is 
something which is not money's worth or cannot be turned into money, it is not to be 
. ~ ~ 
regarded as income." This decision was not followed in the Appellate Division decision in 
C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and Otheri l where it was held that "the 
question whether a receipt or accrual in a form other than money has a money value is the 
primary question and the question whether such receipt or accrual can be turned into 
money is but one of the ways in which it can be determined whether or not this is the 
case". In barter transactions no money is involved but a taxpayer is taxed on the value of 
47 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 (3) SA 256 (C) at 260 
48 Lategan v CIR (1926) AD 
49 CIR v Butcher Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 301at 318 
50 CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242, at 251 
51 C:SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd and Others 69 SATe 205 at 207 
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the asset received, if it is not of a capital nature52. Where an amount cannot be established, 
gross income will not arise from that undeterminable amount; Feetham, l.A., in CIR v 
Butcher Bros. (Ply) Ltd. 53 , stated (obiter) that ,ca'consideration must have a money value". 
This does not mean that where it is difficult to determine the amount it is non-existent, and 
therefore not taxable54 . 
Thieves may steal either cash or goods, the perpetrators of fraud may defraud their victims 
of cash or goods and prostitutes may receive gifts as well as cash for their services. If the 
goods fall within the other requirements of "gross income" they would be taxable and the 
"amount" would have to be determined. 
2.2.2 RECEIVED 
All amounts received by a taxpayer are included in "gross income", provided they comply 
with all the other requirements of the definition. Not all obtainIng of physical control of 
money, however, amounts to a receipt. Geldenhuys v CIR55 (heard in the Cape provincial 
. ~. 
division of the Supreme Court) concerned a usufruct created in terms of a massed will 
over a flock of sheep. After farming with the sheep for a number of years during which a 
number of sheep were sold, a number died due to drought and the numbers were never 
restored to the original number on the date of death of the testator, the flock was sold with 
the consent of the "remaindermen" and the proceeds deposited in the bank account of the 
usufructuary. The question. before the court was whether the difference between the 
proceeds and the original value of the flock at the date of death was taxable in the hands of 
the usufructuary, the proceeds having been "received" by her in terms of the definition of 
"gross income". Furthermore, the question arose whether the provisions of the Act 
relating to the taxation of pastoral, agricultural or other farming operations (in terms of 
52 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax volume 1 (2003)18-27 
53 CIR v Butcher Bros. (Pty) Ltd. 1945 AD 301, l3 SATC 21 
54 Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 25th ed (2006) 10 
55 Geldenhuys v CIR 14 SATC 419 
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section 14 of the Income Tax Act 39 of 1945) created a new definition of "taxable 
income". 
-, 
Steyn, J stated as follows (at 431): 
Both "income" and "taxable income" are in their respective definitions linked llffwlth the 
definition of "gross income" and it seems to be clear that in the definition of "gross income" 
the words "received by or accrued to or in favour of any person" relate to the taxpayer, and 
the words "received by" must mean "received by the taxpayer on his own behalf and for his 
own benefit". 
In SIR v Smant56 the taxpayer divested himself of his right to receive amounts In 
connection with shares in a company. The court held that the continued payment of 
dividends to him did not give him a right to them, that he was obliged to repay it when he 
received it and thus such receipts were not for his own benefjt. ~_ 
For thieves and the perpetrators of fraud, the sole reason for their actions is to benefit 
themselves and, indeed, they do apply the amounts they take from their victims for their 
own benefit. 
2.2.2.1 "RECEIVED" IN RELATION TO FRAUD 
Fraudulent schemes may take on many forms and one such form that was frequently the 
subject of court decisions is one where the perpetrator of the fraud enriches himself or 
herself out of moneys entrusted to him or her by others. ITC 162457 dealt with a case 
where a member of a close corporation, which paid wharfage fees on behalf of a client, 
fraudulently recovered amounts in excess of the amollnts paid out on behalf of the client, 
misappropriating the amounts. The close corporation's financial statements for the year in 
question disclosed an amount of R200 814 as part of the "fees and disbursements 
56 SIR v Smant 1973 (1) SA 754 CD) at 764 
57 1TC 1624 (1997) 59 SATe 373 
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recovered" and also as "less disbursements and fees". The close corporation (the 
appellant) maintained that the disputed amount formed part of "accounts payable", while 
the Commissioner for Inland Revenue contend'ed that it was a provision in respect of the 
client's claim and therefore not deductible. In his appeal to the Commissioner in relation 
to the question of the receipt of the amount fraudulently recovered, the accounting officer 
of the appellant relied on the decision in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 20 SATC 113 stating 
that the monies were received on behalf of various principals of the close corporation as 
the ultimate beneficiaries under circumstances where a loan obligation was imposed to 
repay such monies to its Principal and that the receipt of the monies is therefore in the 
nature of a capital receipt. The case presented to the Court for the appellant, however, was 
that the disputed sum had not been received by the appellant so as to constitute "gross 
income" as it had not been received "on its own behalf and for its own benefit" and "it had 
not received it in such circumstances as to become entitled to it", citing Geldenhuys v CIR, 
CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd, CIR v Smant, COT v G 43 SA TS:l~9 and other cases. It was 
also contended that the close corporation was entitled to claim a deduction of the saIEe 
amount as it had received as expenditure incurred in the production of income -in teITrlS of 
section 1 1 (a) of the Act (to be discussed in paragraph 3.2.3). 
It was held (inter alia): 
(i) That where a trader receives a payment of money in the course of carrying on its trade which it 
obtains by making a fraudulent or, for that matter, negligent misrepresent~tion to a customer, it 
receives that money and has intended to receive it as part of its business income and in the 
course of its business. 
(ii) That if the money is paid to an agent, in the broad sense, for the purpose of being paid by him 
to another for the payer's benefit, -so that the agent is in essence a conduit or trustee, the effect 
of the contra'?! is that the money has not been received by the agent for his own benefit and it 
has also not been received as a reward or remuneration for services rendered and that applies to 
moneys legitimately recovered by the appellant from its customer A for disbursements made to 
others. [own emphasis] 
(iii) That if a dishonest attorney recovered from his or her client a sum for a witness fee and 
corruptly negotiated with the witness to accept a lesser sum than he or she had charged, so that 
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he or she could retain the balance, it could surely not be suggested that the attorney had not 
received, in the tax sense, the overcharged amount and the same would apply to the disputed 
sum obtained by the appellant in the case by qverreaching [sic] its client. 
The appeal was therefore dismissed. 
ITC 179258 concerned a stockbroker who was a member of a stock-broking firm on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange, buying and selling securities on behalf of clients for 
their benefit - thus acting as an agent pursuant to a mandate given to him by clients. He 
had become involved in a syndicate with dealers or portfolio managers acting on behalf of 
a client. The syndicate purchased shares, which it generally knew the client intended to 
purchase and sold the shares at a profit to the client. The stockbroker's share of these 
illeg~l profits was the subject of an appeal against the Commissioner for SARS who 
included them in his "gross income", on the grounds that the amounts did not constitute 
part of his "gross income" as they were not beneficially receiVect ~It was held as follows: 
(i) That it is clear that income received is subject to tax notwithstanding the fact that it was tainted 
with illegality or was received from illegal activities, but this was not the issue in this case, as 
the issue to be determined was whether the receipt of secret profits by an agent fell within the 
'gross income' of the agent and it is accepted that illegally earned income can be taxable. 
(ii) That on the facts of this case there was no 'taking' as set out in COT v G 43 SATe 159 as 
appellant received the proceeds of the sales as well as the original shares and his act was not a 
unilateral act as in G's case; 1110reover, on the evidence, the syndicate and its members 
intended to 'receive' the profits for themselves but this intention will be disregarded. 
(iii) That the word 'received' has various qualifications and not every obtaining of physical control 
over money or money's worth constituted a receipt for the purposes of the definition of 'gross 
income' (CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 20 SATe 113) and this was made clear by Geldenhuys v 
CIR 14 SATe 419 where 'received by' was construed to mean 'received by the taxpayer on his 
own behalf and for his own benefit'. 
(iv) That in order for there to be a 'receipt' the money must be 'received' by the taxpayer for his 
own benefit and in this matter the subjective intention of the syndicate and the appellant was to 
receive the secret profits for themselves but this, however, did not mean that, legally, they had 
58 ITC 1792 69 SATe 236 
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'received' the profits for their own benefit and to understand the distinction an examination of 
the law of agency is required. 
(v) That the shares originally acquired by the?ypdicate belonged not to it but to its principal, M, 
and this was so because the law does not give effect to the sUbjective intention of the syndicate 
and the agent to appropriate the shares or the profits but deems the agent to have received them 
for and on behalf ofthe principal. 
(vi) That it followed that by law neither the shares originally bought nor the profits realised 
belonged to the syndicate or the appellant and were never received by it or appellant in its own 
right or for its or his benefit but by the principal, M. 
(vii) That, accordingly, the profits ofR233 387 and RI 448229 received by the appellant during the 
1990 and 1991 years of assessment did not fall within his 'gross income' for those years. 
The decision in this case is no longer relevant since the decision in MP Finance Group CC 
(in liquidation) v C:SARSS9. The question whether or not amounts are received 
fraudulently are "received" by the perpetrator "on his or her own behalf and for his or her 
own benefit" as required by the definition of "gross income" has finally been settled by 
the decision in the Supreme Court of Appeal case MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) 
v C:SAR~o. For a number of years from 1998 one Marietjie Prinsloo, in th~ wo;ds of 
Howie, P (at 143), "operated an illegal investment enterprise commonly called a pyramid 
scheme. As is the pattern with such schemes, it readily parted greedy or gullible 
'investors' from their money by promising irresistible (but unsustainable) returns on 
various forms of ostensible investment." For a while, such "returns" were paid to some, 
before the scheme collapsed owing many millions. Prinsloo operated the scheme through 
family members, employees and agents soliciting "deposits" in return for commission. 
She controlled all the entities through which the scheme was conducted and she and her 
associates appropriated substantial amounts. 
From 1 March 1999 to 28 February 2002 the perpetrators knew that the scheme )Vas 
fraudulent and that it would not be able to pay all the investors what it had promised. In 
terms of an order of the High Court at Pretoria (on 4 February 2003) all the original 
59 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141 
60 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141 
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entities were consolidated into a single entity named MP Finance Group CC (in 
liquidation). The Commissioner assessed the CC to tax in respect of the 2000, 2001 and 
2002 years of assessment. The liquidators objected on behalf of the CC contending, in the 
main, that the investment amounts ('deposits') were not "received" within the meaning of 
"gross income" as defined in the Act, which objection was disallowed. The appeal to the 
Tax Court was dismissed, the court concluding that the deposits were "rece1pts~' within the 
meaning of the Act, despite the fact that the scheme was illegal. 
The subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was based on two submissions: 
• the deposits were not taxable because they were not amounts "received"; and 
• any tax payable could not in law be owed by the CC because it was merely a 
creature of convenience formed after the tax years in question (this submission will 
not be discussed any further as it is not relevant to the_preJ~nt research). 
The court held as follows: 
(i) That in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 'gross income' meant the total amount 'received 
by or accrued to or in favour' of a taxpayer during a tax year but this case was concerned with 
receipt, not accrual. 
(ii) That the inference on the facts must be that whatever intention there was at any time on the 
part of investors to enter into a contractual relationship with the entities concerned and 
whatever corresponding intention'to contract there might possibly have been on the relevant 
entities' part prior to 1 March 1999, there can no longer have been any such corresponding 
intention after that date as from that date onwards the entities run by Prinsloo made their 
money by swindling the public. 
(iii) That it followed that the amounts that the entities run by Prinsloo were paid in that period were 
'received' within the meaning of the Income Tax A~! 58 of 1962 and it was for appellant to 
prove the contrary and that onus was not discharged. 
(iv) That the court's judgement in the matter of Fourie NO v Edeling NO [2006] 4 All SA 393 
(SeA) did not assist appellant as that case dealt with the relationship between investor and 
scheme and the present case was about the relationship between scheme andfiscus; moreover, 
even if the scheme was legally obliged to repay an investor immediately on receipt, that was 
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because of the legal principles applicable to the parties to an illegal contract, as between 
themselves. [own emphasis] 
(v) That an illegal contract is not without< all legal consequences and it can have fiscal 
consequences, ie the sole question as between scheme andfiscus was whether the amounts paid 
to the scheme in the tax years in issue came within the literal meaning of the Income Tax Act 
and unquestionably they did. 
(vi) That the amounts paid to the scheme were accepted by the operators of the scheme with the 
intention of retaining them for their own benefit and notwithstanding that in law they were 
immediately repayable, they constituted receipts within the meaning of the Income tax Act. 
(vii) That, accordingly, the amounts in issue constituted income received and duly taxable and the 
relevant assessments had been correctly raised. 
Thus, it has been made clear that, irrespective of the legal relationship between the 
perpetrator of the fraud and his or her victim (that of agency or a debtor/creditor 
relationship, for example), there exists a relationship between the perpetrator and the 
fiscus. There can be no doubt that the intention of the perpetralor of fraud was to obtain 
and retain the amounts for his or her own benefit and such amounts were therefore 
"received" for the purposes of "gross income". 
2.2.2.2 "RECEIVED" IN RELATION TO THEFT 
. -
A frequently cited case in relation to theft is Commissioner of Taxes v G61. G had been in 
employment with the government of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), entrusted with funds for 
secret operations. From funds received in excess of what was required for operations, he 
stole money, which he either deposited in his own bank account or used to purchase goods 
for himself. The Commissioner of Taxes (in Rhodesia) assessed the thief on the amounts 
he stole and imposed penalties. He appealed to the Special Court which ruled that the 
-" 
amounts that were stolen were not "received" by him'within the meaning of the word in 
section 8(1) of the Income Tax Act (substantially the same as the definition of "gross 
income" in the South African Income Tax Act). Against this decision, the Commissioner 
61 Commission of Taxes v G 43 SATe 159 
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appealed to the Appellate Division of the High Court of Zimbabwe. Fieldsend, CJ, after 
quoting the definition of "gross income", proceeded to interpret the meaning of the word 
"received". He stated (at 163) that "[i]t was ~~mmon cause that the word 'received' was 
not to be given its ordinary wide meaning and that it had to be limited at least to meaning 
'received as part of the recipient's patrimony'. He referred to the analogy of borrowing a 
~ 
lawnmower or obtaining money on loan; in neither case the asset or amount would be part 
of the income of the recipient. He referred to CIR v Genn & Co (Ply) Ltd v CIR and 
Geldenhuys v CIR in support of his conclusion, which was formulated as follows: 
Whether or not the respondent in this appeal received the money on his own behalf and for 
his own benefit must depend not only on his own intention but on the intention of the 
person who passed the money to him. To return for the moment to the lawn-mower, the 
. person who obtains a lawn-mower from his neighbour genuinely intending to return it does 
not receive the mower in his own right; nor does a person who fraudulently induces his 
neighbour to lend him his mower intending to keep it for himself.- Th~intention of the taker 
cannot of itself result in him receiving the thing in his own right. He can only receive the 
thing in his own right ifthe giver intends that result as well. 
Applying this to the present appeal, the Government never intended that any of the money it 
paid to the respondent should be his to do with it as he liked. It was paid to him to be 
applied to a specific Government purpose. Accordingly, at no time did the respondent 
receive it on his own behalf and for his own benefit. In my view, therefore, it did not fall 
within his gross income and he should not have been taxed on it. 
The appeal was dismissed and the judge held that: 
(i) The word 'received' in the definition must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. 
(ii) Section 8(l~ of the Act, read together with its paragraphs (a) to (q), indicates that it is 
concerned with what comes to a taxpayer from anofher. 
(iii) The respondent did not receive the money in issue; he stole it. 
(iv) Furthermore, all the money paid to the respondent was paid to him to be applied to a specific 
Government purpose; accordingly, at no time did the respondent receive the money on his own 
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behalf and for his own benefit. Consequently, the money in issue formed no part of the 
respondent's gross income and attracted no tax. 
The decision in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C: SARs02 has also decided the 
question whether amounts stolen would fall within the meaning of "received" for the 
purpose of the definition of "gross income". The intention of the thief woufd determine 
that the amount would be received by him or her on his or her own behalf and for his or 
her own benefit, and the intention of the victim would be irrelevant. The contractual 
obligation of the thief to return the stolen goods or money would not alter this, as the 
contractual relationship between the perpetrator and the fiscus was the deciding factor. 
2.2.2.3 "RECEIVED" IN RELATION TO VOID TRANSACTIONS 
fTC 154563 was concerned with two matters: 
• amounts received from the purchase and sale of stolen diamonds; and 
• profits made from the sale of dried "milk cultures" by the taxpayer to a company 
owned and controlled by the taxpayer, which operated a scheme involving the 
buying and selling of dried "milk cultures". 
The first matter concerned the deduction in terms of section I I (a) of the Act of amounts to 
be refunded to the owner of the stolen diamonds and will be discussed in paragraphs 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3. 
The second matter concerned the profit made by the taxpayer from the sale of dried "milk 
cultures". It was common cause that the taxpayer was the instigator of the scheme ~d 
had, in his personal capacity, also participated as a "grower" in the scheme, making a 
profit of RI million by buying and selling to a company to which he had sold his milk 
62 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141 
63 ITC 1545 54 SATC 464 (C) 
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culture "business", and which was owned and controlled by him. It was submitted on 
behalf of the taxpayer that the scheme was a lottery in terms of section 2(1) of the 
Gambling Act 51 of 1965 and the transaction's' giving rise to the money received were 
therefore void ab initio. The taxpayer was not entitled to the amounts and they were 
therefore not "received by or accrued to or in favour of' the taxpayer in terms of the 
definition of "gross income" in section 1 of Act 58 of 1962. 
In this matter it was held as follows: 
(vi) That, assuming, without deciding, that the dried 'milk culture' scheme did constitute a lottery 
in terms of s 2(1) of the Gambling Act 51 of 1965 and that the 'sales' in pursuance of which 
the 'growers' were paid for their crop were void ab initio, the amounts paid to the 'growers' 
for their 'milk cultures' were nevertheless amounts 'received' by them in terms of the 
definition of 'gross income' in s 1 of Act 58 ofl962. 
(vii) That, where an amount is received by a taxpayer-on his own behalf and for his own benefit, but in 
pursuance of a void transaction, there appears to be no reason for holding that slJch ampunt is 
not 'received' within the meaning of the definition of gross income in s 1, if that word is to be 
given its ordinary literal meaning. 
(viii) That, indeed, it does not follow that because a contract is prohibited by statute and therefore void 
inter partes, it is to be totally disregarded and all the consequences flowing from it ignored. 
(ix) That the mere fact that the taxpayer was in effect the organiser of the scheme did not justify t~,,-
inference that he could not also have participated in it as an ordinary 'grower' and, instead, 
must have simply helped himseIfto the funds available; there being no basis for the conclusion 
that there was merely a 'taking' by the taxpayer as opposed to a receiving. 
The Commissioner's assessments in respect of the amounts ofR500 000 in each of the tax 
years 1984 and 1985 in respect of normal tax were confirmed. 
For thieves, the sole reason for stealing is to acquire the stolen property for their own 
benefit. For the perpetrators of fraud, the same applies. Prostitutes, pimps and brothel 
owners engage in their activities to acquire income for their own use and benefit. It would 
appear therefore, that amounts derived from theft, fraud and prostitution are received by 
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the perpetrators of the crimes, irrespective of the intention of the victims, the contractual 
relationship (or lack thereof) between the perpetrator and the victim, or the fact that the 
transactions are void. < • 
2.2.3 ACCRUAL 
In CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltcf4 it was held that an amount accrues to a 
taxpayer when the taxpayer becomes entitled to it. In Mooi v SIR65, on the other hand, it 
was held that an amount accrues to the taxpayer when he or she becomes unconditionally 
entitled to it. There is no accrual unless the amount has beneficially accrued to the 
taxpayer66. If the taxpayer's entitlement to income is subject to a suspensive condition, 
then pending the fulfilment of the condition, there is no accrual to the payee67. In CIR v 
Delfos68 it was held that the use of the disjunctive 'or' between 'received by' and 'accrued 
to' was intended to give the Commissioner the authority to levy tax on either receipt or 
accrual. The taxpayer is not liable for tax for an amount thatilarnot accrued, if it has also 
not been received. Tax is therefore levied on the earlier of the date of receipt or accrual.,> 
If an amount has accrued to a taxpayer during a year of assessment and the taxpayer has 
included it in his or her gross income for that year, the Commissioner is bound to include 
it in the taxpayer's gross income computation for that year69. The Commissioner is not 
entitled to refuse to include an accrual or to postpone assessment until the amount is 
received70. An amount received by the taxpayer before it accrues is taxable in the year of 
its receipt if it is beneficially received by the taxpayer7]. A thief and the perpetrator of 
fraud can only become the "rightful owner" of the stolen property after the victim's right 
to institute a claim against them has lapsed. Thus a thief or the perpetrator of fraud can 
64 CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 52 SATC 9 
65 Mooi v SIR 1972 AD. .. 
66 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947 (3) SA 256 © 14 SATe 419 and CIR v Cape Consumers (Pty) Ltd (1999) 61 
SATC 91 
67 Ochberg v CIR 1933 CPD 256 
68 CIR v Delfos 6 SA TC 92 
69 Silke Silke on South African Income Tm volume 1 (2003) 2-4-1 
70 Silke Silke on South African Income Tm volume 1 (2003) 2-4-1 
71 ITC 702 (1950) 17 SATC 145; ITC 675 (1949) 16 SATC 238 
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only, it appears, be entitled to the stolen property when the victim's right to sue and the 
right to institute criminal proceedings have lapsed. This does not, however, preclude the 
levying of tax because, although the right to the property may not have accrued to the thief 
or perpetrator of fraud, it would have been received in terms of the tests established in 
court decisions and thus the Commissioner can levy tax on such amounts on the basis of 
receipt. In the case of prostitution, the business would be conducted on a cash basis and 
there would be no need to address the question of accrual. 
2.2.4 CAPITAL OR REVENUE 
In CIR v Visser72 a revenue receipt was defined as what is produced by capital or as the 
fruits of capital. Income also includes the product of a man's wits and energy. Income is 
derived from capital that has been productively employed or 1S received for services 
rend~red73; it is sometimes defined as that which is earned by labour74. Capital on the 
other hand is what produces income. Proceeds from the disposal-of an income-producing 
asset by a person not trading in such assets are capital in nature75. It is important, for tax 
purposes, to distinguish between capital and revenue receipts, as they have different tax 
implications and attract tax at different rates. When a taxpayer is carrying on a trade 
dealing in commodities or services, what he or she earns is revenue. 
The rates of taxation differ if the item to be taxed is capital or revenue in nature. It is 
therefore vital to determine whether the amounts received by or accrued to prostitutes, 
thieves and the perpetrators of fraud are capital or revenue in nature. A human body for 
tax purposes is regarded as capital and what it produces is revenue. Prostitutes thus 
receive revenue receipts as they use their bodies to obtain income. The same principle 
applies to fraud and theft as the perpetrators apply their minds to the planning of the crime 
72 CIR v Visser 8 SATC 271 
73 CIR v Visser 8 SATC 271 
74 CIR v Lunnon 1924 AD 94 at 94. 
75 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax volume 1 (2003) 3-3 
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and use their energy to carry out such plans. It is therefore submitted that thieves and 
perpetrators of fraud receive revenue receipts when they perform their unlawful activities. 
-(, , 
There are circumstances where the "amount" received by a prostitute or thief may be of a 
capital nature. Prostitutes may receive gifts from their clients. These may be fortuitous 
and therefore of a capital nature. In terms of paragraph (c) of "gross income", however, 
"any amount, including any voluntary award, received or accrued in respect of or by virtue 
of services rendered or to be rendered or any amount ... received or accrued in respect of 
or by virtue of any employment ... " is included in gross income. In CIR v Kotze 76 the 
appellant received a reward for providing information to the South African Police. It was 
held that the taxpayer had been rewarded for a service that he had rendered and that the 
payment fell within the ambit of paragraph (c) of gross income. It can be argued that the 
gifts received by prostitutes, though fortuitous, are closely connected with the service they 
provide and are therefore taxable. 
A thief may commit the crime of theft only once as a result of an opportunity -that arises. 
There could be an argument that this, too, is a fortuitous gain and therefore of a capital 
nature. It is submitted that it may be no different from someone picking up a lost article 
and keeping it and the fact that theft is illegal should not per se expose the value of the 
stolen item to tax. It could hardly be said that the gains made from fraudulent actions ar.e-
opportunistic, as these are planned and carried out with intent to defraud. 
Taxable capital gains are determined in terms of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act and the gain so determined is added to taxable income in terms of section 26A of the 
Income Tax Act. Potential capital gains arising from illegal activities are not discussed in 
this thesis, except to nqte that the general principle relat~ng to the taxation of income from 
illegal activities would apply also to these gains. 
76 (1998) 64 SATe 447 
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2.2.5 CONTINGENT RIGHTS 
In the case of fraud and theft, the owner of the thing stolen or fraudulently gained has 
certain rights. These rights and the remedies available to the victims of these crimes are 
discussed below. The question whether the criminals only conditionally "receive" the 
fruits of their illegal activities in view of the potential claim for restitution~ ofihe property 
or compensation for loss, is also discussed. 
2.2.5.1 OWNERSHIP 
Ownership entitles the owner to do within and on his property as he or she pleases within 
the restrictions imposed by lawn. Ownership of movable property passes by delivery and 
ownership of immovable property passes by registration78 • For ownership to pass the thing 
must -be capable of being held in private ownership, the transferor must be capable of 
transferring ownership and the transferor must have the intentiolrof passing ownership79. 
When one person defrauds another or steals from another, the person being stolen from .or 
the person being defrauded is not aware of the fraud or theft and hence it cannot be held 
that they transferred ownership or intended to transfer ownership of their property or 
money. In terms of the Prescription Act80 one can acquire ownership by continuous 
possession of another person's movable or immovable property for thirty years. In other 
words if the rightful owner has not claimed his or her property for thirty years the person -
in possession of such property becomes the owner of the property by default. 
In cases of illegal activities the question of ownership only becomes an issue when there is 
fraud or theft as the rightful owners are not aware that they are parting with their property. 
The rightful owners in other words do not intend to pass ownership to the thief or the 
perpetrator of fraud and they acquire a right to claim .certain remedies. Thieves and the 
perpetrators of fraud can thus be the owner of property so acquired only after the expiry of 
77 Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 113 (T) 1120 
78 Van der Merwe "Things" LA WSA Vol 27 para 326 
79 Van der Merwe "Things" LA WSA Vol 27 para 326 
80 Prescription Act 18 of 1943 section 2 
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the thirty year period if such property was not claimed by the owner. When dealing with 
prostitution on the other hand, the prostitute earns the money after performing his or her 
duties. They therefore acquire ownership of the money immediately and the issue of a 
rightful owner reclaiming it does not arise. 
2.2.5.2 REMEDIES 
The victim of a loss due to theft or fraud has remedies, namely the mandamant van spolie 
and the remedy provided for in section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act8!. Spoliation 
implies a deprivation and not a mere disturbance of possession82• The purpose of a 
spoliation order or a mandamant van spo/ie is to restore the status quo and return the thing 
or property to a person who is able to prove that he or she was in undisturbed possession 
of the thing and that he or she was unlawfully deprived ofpossession83 . The order 
therefore requires the spoliator to restore possession to the person who was in undisturbed 
possession before the spoliation took place. The applicant mustc«Hege and prove unlawful 
deprivation of possession by the defendant84 . Possession in this case does not include the 
proving of ownership; the applicant only has to prove actual physical possession and'not a 
right to possession85. This remedy is not an appropriate remedy where property is 
destroyed86 . In other words if the victim's money has all been spent by the perpetrator, the 
victim cannot seek recourse in law using a spoliation order. 
Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that where a person is convicted of an 
offence which caused damage to another the court may, upon the request' of the prosecutor 
acting on the instruction of the injured person, order compensation for such damage or 
loss. Such an order can only be made if it has been established that a loss or damage was 
caused as a direct result of the commission of the offence of which the accused was 
81 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
82 Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 5th edition (2006) 295 
83 Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 5th edition (2006) 288 
84 Harms Amler's Precedents of Pleadings 6th edition (2003) 318 
85 Harms Amler's Precedents of Pleadings 6th edition (2003) 317 
86 Harms Amler's Precedents of Pleadings 6th edition (2003) 318 
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convicted87. The order in terms of section 300 was held to be inappropriate where the 
accused was to be sent to prison for a substantial period of time and has no assets88 . A 
victim in whose favour the award is granted mgy; within sixty days after the date on which 
the award was made, renounce the award by lodging a document of renunciation with the 
clerk or registrar of the court89. This remedy, like the spoliation order, is only effective if 
the accused or the defendant has property. 
The victim can, if insured, claim the loss from his or her insurance company. The 
insurance company will then compensate the victim and acquire the right to claim or sue 
the perpetrator for the amount of the loss. The victim can also, under certain 
circumstances, claim as a deduction from gross income the value of the loss suffered as a 
result of theft or fraud. For a loss due to theft or fraud to be deductible, the taxpayer must 
estabiish that the risk of the loss which he seeks to deduct from his income is inseparable 
from, or is a necessary ingredient of, carrying on that particlliadmsiness90 . In fTC 126891, 
a firm was robbed an amount of money that was in a safe and the loss was claimed as,>a 
deduction. The court held that the amount in issue was floating capital and was therefore a 
loss deductible by the firm92. In fTC 81593, where trust money was stolen, it was held by 
the court that the loss incurred in respect of the moneys and the legal expenditure in the 
attempted recovery thereof, was incurred in the course of operations directed at the 
production of income and that the risk of loss in the manner in which this had been 
incurred was a necessary incident of the partnership business; consequently such loss was 
properly deductible. The fact that the victim may be able to deduct the loss sustained 
through fraud or theft does not, however, have the effect that the perpetrator of the crime 
is automatically taxed on the gain. 
87 S v Luthuli 1972 (4) SA 463 (N) 
88 S v Baloyi 1981 (2) SA 227 (T) 229H 
89 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, s300( 5) 
90 ITC 1242 (1975) 37 SATe 306 (C) 
91 ITC 1268 40 SATe 57 
92 ITC 1268 40 SATe 57 at 57 
93 ITC 815 20 SATC 487 
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If the victim obtains a judgment against the perpetrator he or she will have thirty years to 
enforce such a judgment against the perpetrator94 . The right to institute a prosecution for 
any offence other than murder, kidnapping, 'child-stealing, rape, treason or genocide, 
lapses after twenty years from the date of the commission of the offence95 . This means that 
a thief will become the owner of what he or she has stolen if the owner does not sue the 
thief within thirty years or institute criminal prosecution within twenty years: 
2.2.5.3 CONDITIONAL RECEIPT 
A condition is the attachment of an event which, on account of its certain future 
happening, suspends the performance or obligations flowing from a contract96 . A 
condition suspends the obligations until the occurrence or the fulfilment of such a 
condition97. A modus on the other hand is a clause that requires a party receiving a benefit 
to provide security or to agree to do or not to do something in consideration of the benefit 
bestowed98 . An amount accrues to a taxpayer if the taxpayer"has a vested right to it99. 
When a right is vested in a person it means that such a person is the owner of that rightI~O. 
The court in fTC 903101 held that if a beneficiary has a vested right the income would 
properly be taxable in that beneficiary's hands and not in the hands of the donor or 
trustees. A contingent right on the other hand denotes a right which is conditional and 
uncertain, as opposed to a vested right which is certain, unconditional and immediately 
acquired, even though in some instances enjoyment of the right may be postponedI02 . 
South African law provides that an amount shall accrue to a taxpayer and be included in 
the taxpayer's gross income when the taxpayer acquires an unconditional right to such 
94 Prescription Act 18 Of 1943 section 3(2)(e)(ii) 
95 The Criminal Procedure"Act 51 ofl977, section 18 
96 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 131 
97 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 13 
98 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 133 
99 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax volume 1 (2003) 2-16-2 
100 Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 at 175-6 
101 ITC 90323 SATC 516 at 519 
102 Durban City Council v Association of Building Societies 1942 AD 27,33-4 
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income 103 . If the grant of a conditional right to income were to be regarded as giving rise 
to the accrual of an amount and the condition was in fact never fulfilled, the result would 
be that the taxpayer would pay tax on something-which in reality never became part of his 
income104. The principle of levying tax on an amount when all conditions have been 
fulfilled does not apply if the condition in question only relates to the postponement of the 
date of enjoyment105 . In cases that involve theft and fraud can it be held that the chance of 
being sued or having a criminal charge brought against the thief is a condition which 
delays the imposition of tax? Does the thirty years (or twenty years) it takes for a claim to 
lapse amount to a suspensive condition in respect to the receipt of income from illegal 
activities? It is submitted that the fact that restitution may have to be made will not 
preclude an amount from being included in gross income as the intention of the taker was 
to keep the stolen goods or money, without contemplating its return. Once again, the 
decis-ion in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS106 is authority for this 
conclusion. 
2.2.5.4 REFUND 
The "receipt" of income with an obligation to repay it has been examined in many cases 
and in the so-called deposit cases107 it was held that once the taxpayer receives an amount 
as his own during a tax year, the fact that in terms of his contract he may, in certain 
circumstances, have to repay that amount, does not have the effect of excluding sllcb-
amounts from his 'gross income' for the year in which he received the amounts. The 
taxpayer in fTC 1346108 was granted paid study leave under the conditio~ that he returned 
to the employer and worked for the employer when the research was completed and that 
failure to do so would result in the taxpayer being ordered to repay the salaries received 
during the leave. It was held that the salaries had been received and retained by the 
103 CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 52 SATe 9 
104 Mooi v SIR 1972 AD at 678B. 
105 Silke Silke on South African Income Tax volume 1 (2003) -16-3 
106 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATe 141 
107 Including Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR 14 SATe 295 and Grease (SA) Ltd v CIR 17 SATe 358 
108 ITC 1346 44 SATe 31 
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taxpayer as his own during the tax year in question, and that the contingent liability to 
repay the university did not exclude the said sum from the taxpayer's gross income for that 
yearI09• In IrC 1669110 the taxpayer company processed raw hides on behalf of its 
shareholders and invoiced them for this. At the end of the tax year the company granted its 
shareholders rebates on the amounts paid for the processing of hides. The company then 
claimed the rebates as a deduction. The court held that the fact that the coinpany later 
repaid part of the amounts it received did not have the effect of excluding such amounts 
~. • III lrom Its gross Income . 
These cases raise an inference that the South African tax system levies tax on taxpayers 
who receive amounts as their own, regardless of the obligation to repay them. A 
contrasting decision was made in C v corIl2 where the taxpayer recorded deposits from 
customers as creditors in his books of account, deposited them into his only bank account 
and used them to meet expenses of the business. The court _hel~lhat the deposits did not 
constitute ordinary revenue income but were working capital which may be equated to a 
bank loan and were thus not taxed1l3. As this case was heard by a Zimbabwean -court 
(then Rhodesian) it does not create a binding precedent in South Africa. South African 
case law therefore indicates that the obligation to refund an amount does not amount to a 
hindrance of beneficial receipt and thus if the taxpayer beneficially received an amount 
that taxpayer is liable for tax on the amount so received. When a thief or the perpetrator of-
fraud "receives" an amount from illegal activities they do so for their own benefit and thus 
receive it for tax purposes. The chance-of a case being brought against a'taxpayer will, as 
tax law stands, have no effect on the tax liability for the stolen or embezzled money as it 
would have been received for the perpetrator's own benefit. It does not matter for tax 
purposes that the taxpayer was not entitled to retain the goods or the money. The only 
factor that matters is tl"!.at it was received by the taxpay~r with the intention of retaining it 
!O9 1TC 1346 44 SATC 31 33 
110 1TC 1669 (1999) 61 SATC 479 
III 1TC 1669 (1999) 61 SATC 479 
112 CvCOT46 SATC 57 
113 C V COT 46 SA TC 57 at 62 
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for his or her own benefit I 14 • The argument is not relevant when dealing with prostitution 
as there is no victim per se who at law can have a right to claim the money earned by the 
prostitute. In the case of a prostitute and those<living on the earnings of prostitution, what 
is received or what accrues would be included in gross income. 
2.2.6 EARNINGS FLOWING FROM ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
Prostitutes may work in a brothel and earn salaries or commission; thieves in a syndicate 
may be employed to steal on behalf of a crime "boss" and earn salaries or commission; the 
perpetrators of fraudulent schemes may employ others at a salary or for commission to 
work for them. Those who work or provide services in an illegal business are taxable on 
their earnings in terms or paragraph (c) of the definition of "gross income" as they provide 
services in return for fees. The fact that the business is illegal would not alter this 
principle. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
Revenue laws in South Africa cast the net wide so as to catch and levy tax on a wide range 
of income 115. For income from illegal activities (or legal activities) to be taxed it must fall 
within the ambit of the gross income definition I 16. When determining the tax liability of a 
taxpayer the legality or illegality of a business carried on by the taxpayer is immaterial I 17. 
Illegal activities can be grouped into two categories: a legal trade tainted by an illegal 
activity and activities that are patently illegalIl8. In CIR v Insolvent Estate Botha1J9 it was 
held that although illegal agreements are void inter partes this does not rob them of all 
legal results, in other words an illegal contract is not without all legal consequences, it 
114 MP Finance Group CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service [2007] SeA 71 (RSA) [1:2] 
115 ITC 1199 36 SATe 16 at 19 
116 Warneke and Warden 'Fraudulent transactions: are the receipts taxable?' (2003) Tax Planning: Corporate 
and Personal 17 (2) at 26 
117 CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Company 32 SATe 47 
118 Monterio 'Money doesn't smell' (2005) Without Prejudice 5 (7) at 12-13. 
119 CIR v Insolvent Estate Botha 52 SATe 47 
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continues to have fiscal consequences. This was also the decision in MP Finance Group 
cc v C: SARSI20. 
Court decisions have established the principle that income is taxable, regardless of the 
legality or illegality of the source from which it was derived. Furthermore, the fact that 
the perpetrators of the crimes of theft or fraud may have to return the goodS" or~compensate 
their victims does not suspend the inclusion of the amounts in their "gross income". 
120 MP Finance Group CC v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service [2007] SeA 71 (RSA) [12] 
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CHAPTER 3: TAXABLE INCOME FROM ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES - THE GENERAL DEDUCTION 
FORMULA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the inclusion of amounts derived from illegal activities in 
the "gross income" of the perpetrators of the crimes and concluded that the illegality of the 
business from which the receipts or accruals arose did not prevent their inclusion in "gross 
income". The perpetrators of the illegal activities of prostitution, theft or fraud may incur 
expenses in deriving their ill-gotten income, and this aspect is discussed in the present 
chapter. In doing so, the second objective of the research is addressed: to analyse the 
deductibility of expenses incurred in the production of income from illegal activities. 
3.2 THE GENERAL DEDUCTION FORMULA 
The preamble to section 11, section l1(a), section 23(f) and section 23(g) of the Income 
Tax Act constitute the so-called general deduction formula which forms the cornerstone of 
the deduction provisions of the Income Tax Act. The preamble to and section II(a) 
provide as follows: 
For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from 
carrying on any trade, there shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such 
person so derived -
(a) expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of income, 
provided such expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature ... 
and sections 23(f) and 23(g) provide as follows: 
No deduction shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, namely-
(f) any expenses incurred in respect of any amounts received or accrued which do not 
constitute income as defined in section one; 
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(g) any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent 
to which such moneys were not laid out or expended for the purposes oftrade ... 
For expenditure or a loss to be deductible it must meet all the requirements laid down in 
the preamble to section 11 and section II(a) and not be prohibited by section 23 of the 
Income Tax Act. Failure to meet anyone requirement results in disallowi1,!g p~art of or the 
whole deduction claimed 121. In Sub-Nigel LTD v CIR122 it was held that the court is not 
concerned with deductions which may be considered proper from the point of view of a 
trader or an accountant, but is concerned with the deductions which are permissible 
according to the language of the Act. Regard must therefore be had to the Act in order to 
ascertain whether or not the deductions sought to be made are permissible123 . 
3.2.1 CARRYING ON A TRADE 
The first requirement, in order to be granted the deductions provided for in the Income 
Tax Act (unless a specific section of the Income Tax Act provroes otherwise), is that the 
person should be carrying on a trade. The definition of "trade,,124 includes "ev€ry 
profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture ... ". The first 
question that arises is whether or not a prostitute, a thief or the perpetrator of fraud, 
engaged in criminal activities, is carrying on a trade. A trade is anything that occupies the 
attention and time of any person for purposes of making a profit125. A venture on the other 
hand means a transaction in which a person risks something with the object of making-a 
profit126. Trade implies an active occupation as opposed to a passive earning of income 127. 
The word trade has a wide meaning and one can conclude that all activities undertaken by 
the taxpayer will constitute a trade as long as they are done with the object of earning 
income 128. An activity can be a trade, but not necessarily a business 129. There are passive 
121 Huxham and Haupt Nates on South African Income Tax 25th e9ition (2006) 63 
122 Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 15 SATe 381 
123 Sub-Nigel Ltd v CIR 15 SATe 381 
124 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, sl 
125 Jones v Welsh Insurance and Corporation LTD 54 TLR 52 
126 ITC 368 (1936) 9 SATe 211 
127 Huxham and Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 25th edition (2006) 62 
128 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South Africa 10-5 
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means of earning income which the Income Tax Act recognises as trades and these 
activities are specifically provided for in the definition of "trade,,130, for example, the 
letting of property and the use or grant of use t>fpatents, copyright, etc. In ITC 770131 it 
was held that the word trade was intended to embrace every profitable activity and thus the 
word should be given the widest meaning possible. In De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
CIR 132, on the other hand, it was held that the attainment of a profit is not the defining 
feature in a trading transaction as a trader may trade at a loss in order to gain a commercial 
advantage. Carrying on a trade does not necessarily give rise to income in any particular 
year of assessment133 . This means that not earning any income does not have any effect on 
whether or not a taxpayer is carrying on a trade. A taxpayer can therefore be carrying on a 
trade even when he has no objective of making a profit or where he deliberately sets out to 
make a IOSSI34. In ITC 615135, where the taxpayer was hiring and sub-letting the leased 
property at the same rental paid by the original tenant, the taxpayer was held to be carrying 
on a trade. The taxpayer's motive for carrying on a trade is )rrelevant136. It is also 
irrelevant whether the taxpayer realises the risks inherent in the transaction 137. 
The Income Tax Act, in defining a trade, does not refer to legality, morality or public 
policy. The definition in the Act is wide and thus one can argue that an illegal activity like 
prostitution amounts to a trade. South African law also provides that a person can carry on 
more than one trade; thus one can be legitimately employed and, at the same time, be the-
master mind behind a fraudulent scheme and be carrying on two trades. The definition of 
trade in section 1 of the Income Tax Act and related case law indicates that, for a trade to 
be carried on, the taxpayer must actively do something and intend to make profit, either 
now or in future. Thieves and the perpetrators of fraud must actively do something - apply 
129 Williams Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax In South Africa Law and Practice 277 
130 Income Tax Act 58 of 19'62 s 1 
131 fTC 77019 SATe 216 
132 De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR 47 SATe 229 
133 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South Africa 10-7 
134 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South Africa 10-7 
135 ITC 615 (1946) 14 SATe 399 
136 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South Africa 10-7 
137 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South Africa 10-8 
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their time, wits and skill in the planning and execution of theft or fraud - and they must do 
this in order to make a profit. Lord Denning stated in Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v JP 
Harrison (Watford) Ltd l38 that a gang of burglars is not engaged in a trade although they 
have an organisation, spend money on equipment, acquire goods by their efforts and sell 
them at a profit. The decision in this United Kingdom case does not appear to reflect the 
position in South African law. 
In Burgess v CIR I39 it was held that if a taxpayer pursues a course of conduct which, 
standing on its own, constitutes the carrying on of a trade, that taxpayer wiII not cease to 
carryon a trade merely because his purpose is to obtain a tax advantage. The courts have 
held that a lack of continuity or a lack of a profit motive may exclude the taxpayer's 
actions from being held to be a trade l40 . When a taxpayer carries on more than one trade in 
the Republic deductions under section 11 can be made from his aggregate income from all 
such trades l41 . This is subject to the provisions of section_ ~OA 142, which limits the 
deduction of expenses to the income from a trade carried on by a person who also earns 
remuneration, under certain circumstances. 
Case law raises an inference that prostitutes, brothel owners and pimps are carrying on a 
trade because of the active application of their time and skill in an endeavour to produce 
income. It is less certain whether fraud or theft is a trade because of its inherent illegali!y 
and immorality even though in theory it meets the requirements of trade. Where 
fraudulent activities or theft are carried on continuously in a businessrlike manner, this 
would appear to constitute a trade. Single instances of these offences may not constitute a 
trade, although it was held in Stephan v CIR143 that the first and only operation was a 
business venture. If the fraud or theft is planned and carried out in a businesslike manner, 
even one instance may constitute a trade. It is less clear, however, in the case of a once-
138 Griffiths (Inspector oftaxex) v JP Harrison (Watford) Ltd 1963 AC 1 at 20 
139 Burgess v CIR (1993) 55 SATC 185 
140 De Koker and Urquhart Income Tax in South /lj'rica 10-5 
141 Williams Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax In South Africa Law and Practice 276 
142 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
143 Stephan v CIR 32 SATC 54 
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off opportunistic offence, rather than an ongoing activity, whether this would constitute a 
trade. 
Once it has been established that the taxpayer is carrying on a trade, any loss or expenses 
incurred would have to satisfy all the other requirements of the general deduction formula 
to qualify as a deduction. 
3.2.2 ACTUALLY INCURRED 
For an expense to be deductible it must actually have been incurred. Expenditure is 
actually incurred when it has been paid and when the taxpayer is under an unconditional 
obligation to pay the amount in question l44 . In Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR145 it was held 
that the expression "actually incurred" means all expenditure for which liability has arisen 
even if that liability has not yet been paid. 
The victim of a loss due to theft or fraud has legal remedies in the form of the mandament 
'.-
van spolie and the remedy provided for in section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 
of 1977 (to be referred to as the Criminal Procedure Act). The purpose of a spoliation 
order or a mandament van spolie is to restore the status quo and return the thing or 
property to a person who is able to prove that he or she was in undisturbed possession of 
the thing and that he or she has been unlawfully deprived of possession 146. This remedY-is· 
not an appropriate remedy where. property is destroyed 147. Section 300 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act provides that where a person is convicted of an offence which caused 
damage to another the court may, upon the request of the prosecutor acting on the 
instruction of the injured person, order compensation for such damage or loss. 
A thief is under an ~bligation to repay stolen money or pay compensation for stolen 
property, but this obligation is subject to the victim obtaining judgment against the 
144 Williams Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax In South Africa Law and Practice 278 
145 Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR 25 SATe 67 
146 Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 5th edition (2006) 295 
147 Harms Amler's Precedents of Pleadings 6th edition (2003) 318 
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perpetrator l48 . In other words, a thief is not under an unconditional obligation to pay the 
amount until a judgment is obtained against him or her. Thus incurring expenditure or 
suffering a loss, when there is a condition or an 'obligation to repay the stolen amount, is 
suspended until the rightful owner obtains a judgment ordering the perpetrator to repay the 
stolen amount. In CIR v Golden Dumps (Ply) Ltd149 the expenditure in question was 
~ 
dependent on a court decision and the decision was delivered a few years after the case 
was brought to court. The court held that the expense was only actually incurred in the 
year of assessment in which the court handed down its decision. If an amount is not 
claimed as a deduction in the year it was incurred, the taxpayer forfeits the right to claim it 
in subsequent years lSO• Expenditure, other than refunds, restitution or the payment of 
compensation, incurred by thieves, perpetrators of fraud and those earning their income 
directly or indirectly through prostitution, or the payment of salaries and wages for the 
serviCes of others involved in the illegal trade, is expenditure actually incurred when the 
obligation to pay has arisen, with no conditions attached. WbenJhe existence of a liability 
is contingent and dependent upon the happening of an event the liability is not incurr,~d 
until the event happenslsl . In Nationale Pers BPK v KBl52 it was held that ifpaynient is 
conditional the expense is only incurred when the condition is fulfilled. An expense is 
therefore not incurred if there is a chance that it will not arise. 
As there is no guarantee that the victim will obtain a judgment and the exact amount to be 
granted in the judgment is unknown, the expense of reimbursing the victim is not actually 
incurred until the judgment is obtained. When expenditure has actualIy been incurred 
during that year of assessment, but the amount cannot be quantified, it must be estimated 
using all available information 153. When a liability is contingent it is incurred in the year 
of assessment the condition is fulfilled ls4 . In CIR v Edgars Stores Lti SS it was held that, 
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where the existence of a liability is certain and established within a tax year, but the 
amount in question cannot be accurately determined at the end of the tax year the liability 
for that amount is nevertheless regarded as having been incurred in that tax year. When an 
expenditure is actually incurred in year one and paid in the next year of assessment if it 
meets the requirements in section II (a) it is deductible in year one l56. In ITC 1499157 the 
taxpayer sought to claim expenditure which was subject to a bona fide dispute and it was 
held that expenditure lacked the degree of certainty and finality to render it actually 
incurred. The fact that the victim of a crime may bring a claim for a certain amount does 
not necessarily mean that he or she will be granted a judgment equal to the claim and 
therefore the thief cannot determine the actual amount for which he or she is liable until 
the judgment is handed down. In ITC 840158 a lessor incurred expenditure on fixtures 
which were to become part of the lessee's property after five years of the lease. The court 
held -that the lessor could not claim the expenditure as it would only be incurred when he 
loses ownership of the fixtures. The Income Tax Act disallows the deduction of 
expenditure which is contingent, threatened or expected l59. As the Act refers to "actua!Jy 
incurred", this implies that accounting provisions are not deductible under this section l6o. 
Notional expenditures are also not deductible under the provisions of section II(a)161. 
The first matter of concern in ITC 1545162 was the amounts received from the purchase 
and sale of stolen diamonds. A number of submissions were made by counsel, on behalf . 
of the trustees of the taxpayer's insolvent estate. In the context it was common cause that 
the taxpayer was aware that the diamonds he bought and sold were stolen and that his 
conduct amounted to theft. It was also common cause that the proceeds of the sales 
amounted to a "receipt or accrual" within the meaning of "gross income" - it was not a 
case in which there had been no receipt but merely a "taking" by a thief. It was submitted 
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that the taxpayer, because of his conduct that amounted to theft, rendered himself liable to 
the owner of the diamonds for their return or their value. This liability was "an 
inseparable and necessary concomitant of the"trade' of dealing in stolen diamonds and 
that, as it arose immediately with each transaction, it had constituted deductible 
expenditure in terms of s 1 1 (a) of Act 58 of 1962 for each of the years in which a profit 
r 
was made." (at page 467). It was also submitted that the assessments should be set aside 
and the taxpayer be re-assessed once the quantum of the owner's claim had been 
determined (the owner had instituted proceedings against the taxpayer in later years of 
assessment). The Commissioner's submission was that whatever the taxpayer's liability 
might turn out to be, it did not constitute expenditure incurred in the relevant years of 
assessment. 
Scott, J stated (at 467) that "[i]t is well established that in order for expenditure to be 
deductible it must have been incurred in the year of assess~ent.fGncerned. In order to be 
deductible the liability must be one which is definite and absolute and not one which)s 
merely contingent". 
It was held as follows in respect of this aspect of the case: 
(iii) That the taxpayer's liability to the owner for the return of the diamonds or their value did n~( 
constitute deductible expenditure in terms of s 11 (a) of Act 58 of 1962 as whether the taxpayer is 
ever made to compensate the .owner or not depended in each case not only upon whether his 
crime was detected but also on the non-happening of an uncertain future event. 
(iv) That, therefore, until at least the owner institutes proceedings against the taxpayer to recover his 
loss from him rather than from any other party, the taxpayer's liability did not amount to 
'expenditure ... actually incurred' within the meaning ofs 11(a). 
(v) That the proceedings against the taxpayer arising out ofthe transactions in question and brought by 
-" 
the owner of the stolen diamonds were instituted sUbseqlient to the years of assessment in question 
and it followed that the appeal against the Commissioner's assessment of the taxpayer for normal 
tax in respect ofthe years ending 30 June 1980, 1981 and 1982 had to fail. [own emphasis] 
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Any contention that a thief or the perpetrator of fraud incurred a liability to return the 
property or to make good the loss of the victim of the crime at the time the amounts were 
~:. , 
received by him or her, would therefore fail. 
The liability to repay the owner of the property or to return the property o~!atned by theft 
or fraud, or to compensate the victim, is thus dependent on judgment being obtained 
against the perpetrator and therefore the liability is not incurred until judgment is handed 
down, unless the payment is made voluntarily. Only at the stage where the judgement is 
obtained or the payment is voluntarily made, will the liability actually be incurred and, 
provided it meets the other requirements of section 11 (a), will it be deductible. Expenses 
actually paid by persons earning their income through the activity of prostitution, through 
theft. or fraud, or expenses incurred in carrying on other illegal activities, for which there is 
a legal liability to pay will, however, have been "incurred" for the purposes of the general 
deduction formula. 
3.2.3 DURING THE YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
The expenditure which the taxpayer claims as a deduction must be incurred during the 
year of assessment in which it is claimed. For example, in Concentra (Pty) Ltd v CfR I63 , 
expenditure relating to directors' expenses which had arisen in earlier years was~o! . 
claimed as a deduction in those years and, by not doing so, the right to claim a deduction 
in terms of section II(a)I64 was foffeiied. When looking at the Income T.ax Act as a whole, 
it deals with one tax year, in that taxpayers are assessed on income they receive in one 
year of assessment and thus the deductions should also be claimed for that one year of 
assessment I65. fTC 1624166 dealt with a close corporation carrying on business as customs 
clearing and freight .forwarding agents (discussed in detail in paragraph 2.2.2.1). The 
taxpayer fraudulently rendered accounts to a client reflecting wharfage fees disbursed in 
163 Concentra (Ply) Ltd v CIR (1942) CPD 12 SATC 95 
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excess of the actual expenditure incurred. One of the submissions made by the appellant 
(the close corporation) was that it was entitled to claim as a deduction the same amount 
that it had overcharged the client (for which a.provision had been created in the financial 
statements) as it had become subject to a simultaneous and corresponding liability to repay 
it. The court held as follows: 
(iv) That it does not follow from the fact that appellant had an obligation to restore what it had 
unlawfully taken from A that it 'actually incurred' 'expenditure' for that sum; it may well be that 
if it paid the amount it would incur a loss which would be treated as having been incurred in the 
production of its income as a necessary concomitant of the trade dishonestly carried on by it but 
that has not happened. 
(v) That it is not a correct reflection of what happened in the present case to say that appellant had 
voluntarily or even to say simply that it expended the amount it is liable to repay to A; it took the 
money with the obvious intention of keeping it in the hope that its fraud would not be found out 
and on the basis that the amount would be repaid if its misconduct \yas discovered, but only then . 
...... ' ....... 
(vi) That the appellant had recognised that it had a liability to pay A the disputed amount so as to result 
in a loss to it and treated its position as such ab initio (ie in the year of assessment) is, .ina~y 
event, difficult to accept as a probability; in any event, when the financial statements for the year 
of assessment in question were prepared, A had not yet discovered the fraud or in any way 
intimated that it intended to claim the money of which it had been defrauded - at most, it is 
probable that appellant had made a provision for the disputed sum and it did so, not by treating 
what it owed A as a liability for the repayment of stolen funds but by means of recordillK 
fictitious 'purchases'. 
(vii) That, accordingly, the disputed sum could not be described as expenditure or a loss actually 
incurred in the production of appellant's income in terms ofs I I (a) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 in the year of assessment concerned and it was also not laid out or expended for the purpose 
of trade as required by s 23(g) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. [own emphasis] 
The obligation to p .. ay or refund the rightful owner of money or property arises after the 
money has been stolen from such owner. The obligation in such cases is not certain as 
the obligation is further dependent on the victim obtaining judgment against the 
perpetrator, unless the payment is made voluntarily. This means that the expenditure 
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can only be claimed in the year it is actually paid, if it meets all the other tests set out 
in section II(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
-< 
3.2.4 IN THE PRODUCTION OF INCOME 
The leading case dealing with the phrase "in the production of income" is Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR167 which involved the payment of co~pe~sation to a 
driver of a tram injured during the course of his employment and who subsequently died 
from his injuries. The company resisted the claim in legal proceedings but eventually was 
ordered to pay damages and also incurred legal costs in resisting the claim. The question 
was whether these expenses were incurred "in the production of income". Watermeyer, 
AlP held that the test is twofold: the act to which the expenditure is attached must be 
performed in the production of income and the test to be applied is subjective: if it is 
performed bona fide for the purpose of carrying on the trade which earns the income and 
the expenditure in question must be so closely linked to such aclthat it can be regarded as 
part of the cost of performing it. It was held further that whether such expenses ~re 
necessary for its performance or attached to it by chance or are bona fide incurred for the 
efficient performance of such operations, they are deductible provided they are so closely 
connected with it that they may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it. 
The expenditure and losses referred to in the Income Tax Act refer to the outgoings and 
losses incurred in the course of or by reason of the ordinary operations undertaken for the 
purpose of conducting business168. For expenditure to qualify as' a deduction, the 
expenditure must relate to a trade carried on by the taxpayer169. The expenditure must have 
been incurred in order to produce income for the taxpayer 170. The words "incurred in the 
production of income" mean actually incurred in the course of or by reason of ordinary 
business operations tmdertaken for the purposes of. conducting the business l7l . In 
167 1936 CPD 241,8 SATC 13 
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Weinburg v CIR 172 it was held that an amount is not deductible if it was not incurred in 
rendering any service in the normal course of business. In COT v Rend/eI73, on the other 
hand, the court mentioned three different types· of expenses that can be incurred in the 
production of income and these are expenses necessary for the performance of the trade, 
expenses incurred for bona fide efficient performance of trade activities and expenses 
attached to the performance by chance. Section ll(a) does not requirerexf>enditure to 
produce income in the same year of assessment in which it was incurred l74 . If the section 
I I (a) requirements are all met the amount is deductible even if it does not produce income 
in that year of assessment or in any year of assessment175 . The court is not concerned with 
whether a particular item of expenditure produced any part of the income but it is 
concerned with whether the expenditure was incurred for purposes of earning income l76 . If 
expenditure is incurred for the purpose of producing income, the fact that it does not 
produce income in that year or in any year is irrelevant 177. Operational costs are costs that 
are naturally and reasonably regarded as expenses that are part ~f the cost of performing 
-
the operations178• The court has a duty to assess the closeness of the connection of an 
expense to the income-earning operations of the business, having regard to the purpose of 
the expenditure l79 . 
It appears to be clear that, provided they meet the other requirements of the general 
deduction formula, the expenses (excluding the amounts specifically prohibited in sectiqll 
23(0)180) incurred by prostitutes, brothel owners and pimps would be expenses incurred in 
the production of their income. The -situation with regard to the expenses incurred by 
thieves and the perpetrators of fraud and, in particular, the expenses incurred in 
compensating the victims of their crimes is not so clear. 
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In COT v Rendle l81 it was held that the deductibility of fortuitous expenditure depends on 
whether the chance or risk of it being incurred is sufficiently closely connected with the 
taxpayer's business operations. The taxpayer must show that the risk of the occurrence of 
the action which gives rise to the expenditure was inseparable from or is a necessary 
incident of carrying on of the particular trade I 82. In fTC 233 183 the faxpayer was a 
stevedore and a passerby was killed by an article that fell from a net while cargo was being 
off-loaded. The court held that the payment of damages is incidental to the trade of a 
stevedore and is deductible. 
Involvement in illegal activities is accompanied by the risk of imprisonment or a civil 
action and in cases of fraud and theft the risk of being ordered to refund the victim. 
Expenses associated with these risks cannot be said to have been incurred in the 
production of income as they relate to a "penalty" in resp~ct.2f income received in an 
earlier period and cannot be said to have been· incurred bona fide for the purpose of 
" 
producing income l84 . To qualify for deduction they would have to be insepara1J.le from the 
type of trade being carried on and their incurrence a concomitant of the business of 
involvement in illegal activities. In Joffe and Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR I85 it was held that all 
expenditure attached to the performance of the operations which constitute the carrying on 
of a trade would be deductible and also expenditure which is not attached to trading_ 
operations but is bona fide incurred for the purposes of trade. The words 'incurred in the 
production of income' must be given the meaning of 'actually incurred in the course of 
and by reason of the ordinary business operations undertaken for the purpose of 
conducting the business'. 
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In COT v Rendle186, the expenditure incurred by the respondent in the reimbursement of 
the companies in respect of the moneys misappropriated by the firm's employee was, 
however, held to be sufficiently closely connected with the firm's business operations as 
to be regarded as part of the cost of performing those operations. It would therefore 
appear that the repayment of amounts stolen, the return of stolen property or the 
compensation paid by the thief or the perpetrator of the fraud to the victim Ior the loss of 
property, if it occurred during the same year of assessment in which the proceeds were 
included in gross income, may be allowed as a deduction (subject to the other 
requirements relating to deductions). It would appear to be an inevitable concomitant of 
the "trade" of theft or fraud that the need to compensate victims would arise. 
3.2.5 NOT OF A CAPITAL NATURE 
Expenditure of a capital nature does not qualify for deduction in terms of the general 
deduction formula. As is the case with receipts and accruals-of a-capital nature, there is no 
definition in the Income Tax Act of what constitutes an expense of a capital nature. It has 
'" 
been left to the courts to provide a number of tests which can be applied under different 
circumstances. In CIR v George Forest Timber Co Ltd187 it was held that money spent in 
creating or acquiring an income-producing concern or source of future income (as opposed 
to money spent in working it) was capital expenditure. In New State Areas Ltd v CIR188 it 
was held that expenditure which is incurred for the purpose of establishing, improving or 
adding to the equipment of the income~producing structure is capital expenditure; whereas 
expenditure which is incurred as part of the cost of performing the i'ncome-producing 
operations is revenue expenditure. 
Persons earning their income from illegal activities, including prostitution, theft and fraud, 
may incur expenditure in acquiring capital equipment needed for their trade. This 
expenditure which is linked to their income-earning struCture would not be deductible in 
terms of section II(a). Provided the expenditure met the requirement of "trade", the 
186 CaTv Rendle 26 SATe 326 at 333 
187 1924 AD 516,1 SATe 20 
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capital expenditure may qualify for deduction in terms of section 11 (e) - wear-and-tear 
allowance - or one of the other provisions of the Income Tax Act providing for the write-
off in instalments of other types of capital expenditure. 
3.2.6 THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF EXPENDITURE AND LOSSES CONNECTED 
WITH ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES 
As is the case with the definition of "gross income", the provisions comprising the general 
deduction formula (or any other provisions) make no mention that the deductions and 
allowances are prohibited in the case of illegal activities. In the 1918 case, CIR v Delagoa 
Bay Cigarette C0189, Bristowe J, held that "if the income [from an illegal business] itself 
is taxable, it follows I think that if the prizes had been a legitimate deduction [and not a 
disposal after they had been earned] had the business been legal, they would equally be a 
legitimate deduction if the business is illegal". A contrary view (albeit an obiter dictum) 
was expressed by Watermeyer, AJP in the case of Port Eliza/z.elh Electric Tramway Co 
Ltd190 when he stated that: "[w]here the act in question, though performed in ~J1e 
production of income, is unlawful or negligent, the expenditure attendant upon such act 
would probably not be deductible". Admittedly this related to the unlawfulness of the 
expenditure itself and not the illegality of the business. However, there still appears to be 
a measure of doubt in this regard. 
Criminal penalties are not deductible l91 . In ITC 1199192 it was held that if fines for 
criminal conduct would qualify as a deduction there would be no public policy barrier 
against allowing such deduction. These fines are not deductible even if the crime was 
committed in the course of income-earning operations193 . This non-deductibility is based 
on public policy and supports the legislature's intention to decrease crime and thus 
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allowing the deduction would be inconsistent with the aim of the legislature l94 . Criminal 
sanctions are not imposed on the taxpayer qua trader but as a personal punishment l95 . A 
fine is a personal punishment not a cost of performing business operations 196. In ITC 
1490197 the taxpayer was a cartage contractor deriving its income from transporting 
goods. The taxpayer wanted to deduct traffic fines incurred in that year of assessment. The 
court held that fines for criminal conduct in the carrying out of business ope-rations cannot 
be regarded as expenditure in the production of income and therefore the expenditure does 
not qualify for deduction under section Il(a). In a Rhodesian case, ITC 121i98 , it was 
held that a deduction of fines incurred was disallowed on the grounds that the section that 
provides for deductions only provides for the deduction of commercial losses and a loss 
that results from a breach of law is not a commercial loss. Persons involved in illegal 
activities would frequently have to pay fines or penalties for so doing and it is clear that 
these-expenses would not be deductible. 
The arguments raised in the cases referred to above that to allow the deduction of fines 
and penalties would be contrary to public policy, could also be raised against the granting 
of the deduction of other expenses incurred in the course of carrying on criminal activities. 
Jacobson 199, however, argues that the use of public policy to disallow expenditure is 
against the philosophy of the Income Tax Act, as a tax collection statute. 
The only provision in the Income Tax Act that deals directly with illegal activities is 
section 23(0) which provides that no deduction will be allowed for any expenditure that 
constitutes an activity contemplated in Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 2004, and where a payment constitutes a fine imposed as a 
result of an unlawful activity. Section 3 of the Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
describes the generat offence of corruption, which relates to accepting or gIvmg a 
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gratification in order to influence another to act in a manner that amounts to the abuse of a 
position of authority, a breach of trust, violation of a duty or a set of rules, in order to 
achieve an unjustified result. This includes the giving of a gratification to or acceptance 
by persons occupying public office, parties in an employment relationship and a list of 
other activities, including sporting events and gambling. The prohibition in section 23(0) 
would not, therefore, relate directly to the offences forming the basis oT tnis research, 
except with regard to fines or penalties incurred in respect of the iIIegal activities, which 
would not be deductible. It is also likely that persons engaging in illegal activities would 
pay bribes or gratifications to persons in authority to promote the success of their 
activities. Such payments would be disalIowed in terms of section 23(0)200 
Jacobson201 , on the issue of the deductibility of fines, proposes the consideration of 
businesses that cannot operate legally and which therefore incur fines as part of carrying 
on trade. Jacobson also argues that such traders know thatiftaey conduct their business 
they will incur fines, but if they do not they wilI not earn income; therefore such fines ~re 
incurred in the production of income and a deduction must be granted, as there can be no 
public policy bar to deductibilitY02. In such a situation it can be inferred that incurring 
fines is a necessary concomitant of the trade and they are necessary for carrying on such a 
trade, thus they are deductible. Section 23(0) has, however, settled the matter and, 
irrespective of the close connection of certain fines with the income-earning activities of . 
the taxpayer, they wilI not be deductible. 
The policy which justifies the inclusion of illegal proceeds in gross income is one of 
revenue collection; the revenue laws place all taxpayers on an equal footing, as far as the 
taxability of their rec~ipts goes203 . In other words, the Income Tax Act provides for the 
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taxation of taxpayers on all their receipts and accruals, irrespective of their source. "It 
follows, then, that the policy underlying the deductibility of expenditure should also be 
one which seeks to place honest and dishonest taxpayers on an equal footing,,204. If the 
honest taxpayer cannot be discriminated against through the delinquent taxpayer being 
allowed to escape the inclusion of his receipts in gross income, then the delinquent 
taxpayer should not be discriminated against through the honest taxpayer beIng allowed 
deductions to which he (the delinquent taxpayer) is not entitled205. In ITC 119g2°6 Margo J 
stated obiter that since income from unlawful trading is assessable to tax, expenditure in 
the production thereof is deductible. There should be no moral interpretation or 
consideration of public policy in interpreting the provisions of the Income Tax Act207. If 
an amount falls within the ambit of the Act it must be taxed and if on the other hand an 
amount meets the deductibility requirements it must be deductible208. 
3.2.7 DEDUCTIBILITY OF OTHER EXPENSES 
Persons involved in the illegal activities of prostitution, fraud or theft may incur a number 
of other expenses in relation to their illegal trades that would not qualify for deduction in 
terms of the general deduction formula. Capital expenses were briefly referred to above 
and, provided expenses relating to an illegal business are deductible in principle, the cost 
of any equipment used in producing the income may qualify for a wear-and-tear allowance 
in terms of section 11 (e) of the Income Tax Act. Repairs to such equipment may qualifi 
for deduction in terms of section 11 (d). 
Another type of expense that persons involved in illegal activities would, sooner or later, 
have to incur is legal expenses. These expenses may not meet the requirements of the 
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general deduction formula, but may be deductible in terms of section 11 (c) of the Income 
Tax Act. This section provides for the deduction of any legal expenses (of the nature 
described in the section) "actually incurred during the year of assessment in respect of any 
claim, dispute or action at law arising in the course of or by reason of the ordinary 
operations undertaken by him in the carrying on of his trade ... ". The expenses need not, 
therefore, be incurred "in the production of income", but by reason of the ordinary 
business operations. Though not deductible in terms of section II(a) of the Income Tax 
Act, the expenses would qualify in terms of section 11 (c), unless the legal expenses are of 
a capital nature, which are also excluded in terms of the paragraph. Legal expenses 
incurred in relation to the offences associated with illegal activities are closely connected 
with the "trade" being carried on illegally - being "by reason of the ordinary operations". 
These legal expenses should comply with section 1 1 (Cf09, unless they are of a capital 
nature. In Smith v SIR210, a case concerning the capital or revenue nature of legal expenses 
incurred by a chartered accountant in defending himself ~gaip.st charges of fraud and 
contraventions of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Act, it was held that "t~e 
dominant purpose would have been to prevent a conviction which would in all-probability 
have entailed a term of imprisonment and certainly lasting disgrace to him as a man ... I 
am unable to regard freedom from imprisonment and from such disgrace as capital assets 
in the ordinary sense . . . [and] I am of the opinion that the appellant's expenditure in 
defending himself against the charges preferred against him is not of a capital nature':.-
Persons involved in prostitution or profiting from the activities of prostitution, who incur 
legal costs to prevent imprisonment -and ensure their the ability to "Continue earning 
income, would (all else being equal) be able to deduct the costs in terms of section 11(cfll 
as non-capital expenses closely connected with their normal business activities. 
209 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
210 Smith v CIR 30 SATe 35 at 41 
211 Income TeL, Act 58 of 1962 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the general deduction fQff!1ula and related case law in principle and 
in particular in relation to income from illegal activities. The principle that has been 
established is that no distinction is made between income obtained legally or illegally. The 
principle may, however, be different when it comes to the deductibility~gf-expenditure 
incurred in the production of legal and illegal income. In general, considerations of public 
policy may prevent the deduction of expenses relating to an illegal activity. Although the 
Income Tax Act does not specifically refer to illegal activities, it is fairly clear that 
prostitution and the direct and indirect earnings from prostitution and the income from 
fraud or theft carried on regularly and in a business-like manner, would constitute a 
"trade", as defined. It also appears that the expenses relating to these illegal activities 
woul? qualify for deduction in terms of the general deduction formula, provided they are 
of a non-capital nature and provided they are bona fide incurred in producing the income 
or are closely connected with the production of the income.t)ther deductions may be 
available in relation to the trade, for example, legal expenses, wear-and-tear allowanc.es On 
capital equipment or its repair. In the case of theft or fraud, the deduction of 
compensation payable to the victims of the crimes may present a problem as these 
expenses would not, it is submitted, be incurred in the production of income. The law is 
clear on one aspect, however, and that is that the deduction of fines, penalties and 
expenses relating to corrupt activities212 is prohibited. 
212 An activity contemplated in Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 12 of 
2004 
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CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
-:; , 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Up to this point, the thesis has dealt with the legal position under South African law, of 
~- ~ 
persons deriving income from illegal activities. This chapter focuses on a brief comparison 
between the tax systems of the United Kingdom, United States of America and South 
Africa in relation to their treatment of income from illegal activities. The aim is to 
compare and contrast the three tax systems, in order to address the third objective of the 
research. 
4.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America (referred to 
as the United States) provides Congress with the power to revy and collect taxes on 
income from whatever source it is derived213 . Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code 
defines the term "gross income" to include all income from whatever source it is derived, 
except as otherwise provided. As a result of this broad definition, gross income includes 
embezzled funds, income from illegal activities and gambling winnings, among numerous 
other items. The United States tax system has similarities to the South African tax system. 
In South Africa the legitimacy or legality of the source of income appears to be irrelevant. 
If the amount in question is gross iflcol11e in terms of the definition it will be taxable. In a 
United States case of United States v Sullivan214 it was held that the mere fact that income 
is from an illegal source or activity does not exempt such a receipt from tax. As a result, in 
Rutkin v United Statei 15 , where the taxpayer obtained the income in question by 
threatening the victim and his family, the court held that failure to disclose this income 
amounted to tax evasion. 
213 Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
214 United States v Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) 
215 Rutkin v United States, 72 Sup Ct 571 (1952) 
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The rationale for taxing wrongdoers on income from illegal activities is not to allow 
wrongdoers to benefit from their misdeeds without paying what is due to thefiscui 16 • 
4.2.1 RECEIPTS 
The United States used to have a claim of right doctrine which held that jncome derived 
from illegal activities cannot constitute income for tax purposes because the taxpayer has 
no claim of right to the income and is under an obligation to return the proceeds217 . Under 
this regime a "taxable gain" referred to income upon which the taxpayer had a claim of 
right in the absence of an unconditional duty to return such gain21S . In the case of James v 
United Statei 19, the claim of right doctrine was rejected and the court held that courts in 
cases that involve the taxability of illegal income should apply the economic benefit 
approach. The economic benefit doctrine asks the question whether or not the taxpayer has 
control over the income from illegal activities, in that it can be reasonably held that such 
taxpayer derives a readily realisable benefit from. it220 . A thIef Steals to benefit himself or 
herself and thus derives a benefit from the stolen property either from its use or realisation. 
The court, in James v United States, held further that the rationale for the adoption of the 
economic benefit doctrine was to stop the injustice brought about by the claim of right 
doctrine which relieves thieves of their duty to support the fisc us by paying tax, while 
honest taxpayers are taxed on all their income. 
The tax system of the United States has moved away from a regime of only taxing the 
rightful owners of income, to a regime that taxes the benefit derived by the taxpayer or by 
the person dealing with the asset or the money in the way that an owner would. The new 
regime abolished the notion of taxing income from legitimate sources only and thus 
216 ColJiton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 278 
217 Monterio 'Money doesn't smell' (2005) Without Prejudice 5 (7) at 12 
218 Commissioner v Willcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946) 
219 James v United States 366 US 213 (1961) 
220 James v United States 366 US 213 (1961) 219 
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income from both legal and illegal sources is subject to tax. In other words the system 
does not consider the right to income but the benefit derived from it. 
4.2.2 DEDUCTIONS 
The mandate to levy tax is provided for in the Constitution but the Constitution does not 
make any provision for the granting of deductions221 • Deductions are tlrus treatures of 
statute and a taxpayer has no intrinsic right to them. Congress thus has the power, but not 
the obligation, to enact laws that allow for deductions222 . In New Colonial Ice Company v. 
Helverinl23 , the court ruled that the tax deductibility of expenses depends merely on 
legislative grace, which means that all exclusions from gross income and every deduction 
can be viewed as gifts from Congress. 
The tax system in the United States levies tax on net income rather than gross income. 
Gross income is made up of all receipts and accruals and net income, on the other hand, is 
made up of gross income minus business losses and non-business losses incurred in the 
production of income. Government and the courts have narrowed the generally accepied 
meaning of the phrase business expenses as used in the deductions section in order that tax 
deduction consequences might not frustrate national and State policy dealing with 
acceptable conduct224 . Although revenue laws allow for the deduction of certain expenses 
incurred in the production of income, other deductions are disallowed on public poli~¥ 
grounds225 • An illegal enterprise may deduct lawful expenses and salaries involved in the 
actual earning of income226 . Por an expense to be deductible it does not .only need to be an 
economic cost of earning income but it must not be against public polic/27. The denial of 
deductions for expenditure incurred in the production of illegal income developed from 
221 Sharp 'Tax accounting for illegal activities' (2003) The National Public Accountant 1 
222 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 280 -" 
223 New Colonial Ice Company v Helvering 292 U.S. 435 (1934) 
224 Commissioner v Heininger 320 U.S. 476 (1943) 
225 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 273 
226 Cohen v Commissioner 176 F.2d 394 (1947) 
227 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (Fall, 1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 
273 at 274 
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case law and the courts held that the deductibility of such expenditure would frustrate 
public policy228. Thus, the denial of deductions on the grounds that they are inconsistent 
with public policy leads to taxpayers paying taK on their receipts or on their gross income 
and not their net income by not being granted the deduction of expenses incurred in 
earning such receipts. The denial of a deduction on the grounds of public policy also leads 
to double punishment in that, by denying a deduction, tax law would 'De ~punishing a 
taxpayer regardless of whether he has already been punished under any other law229. 
Colliton230 argues that the denial of deductions and the taxation of proceeds leads to 
inequitable results and that tax law is not the correct medium to be used to punish 
wrongdoers. In order to maintain consistency throughout the system, it would be 
preferable to regard tax as a mechanism of revenue collection both for the purposes of 
gross income and deductions231 . Public policy has been compared to an unruly horse 
which, when once one gets astride it, he or she never knows where it will carry him or 
her232. Public policy is constantly changing and thus relying on it will lead to uncertainty 
-~ ... -
in tax law and on the implications of certain conduct, because it changes with-eommunity 
values and morals. 
In Sam Mesp33 it was held that salaries paid to employees by an employer engaged in 
illegal activities were not allowable business expense deductions. Denying a delinque!Jt 
taxpayer his deductions is based on the view of taxation as moral barometer, while 
allowing such deductions entails a view of taxation as a mechanism for revenue collection, 
228 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal a~d Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 275 
229 ColIiton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 280 -
230 ColIiton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (Fall, 1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 
273 at 278 
231 Carrie F Keller 'The Implications ofI R C s 280E in Denying Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense 
Deductions to Drug Traffickers' (Winter, 2003) 47 Saint Louis University Law Journal 157 at 163. 
232 Dixie Machine Welding and Metal Works, Inc v United States 315 F.2d 439 (5 th Cir. 1963) 
233 Sam Mesi 25 T.C. 513 (1955) 
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dependent on accurate methods of computation234 . In Commissioner v Sullivan235, the 
court allowed the deduction of rent and wages paid by an illegal bookmaking operation. 
Some courts denied deductions where the payments were not ordinary or necessary, 
without considering public pOlicy236. In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner237 , for 
example, the courts held that the payment of an expense which is against public policy 
does not represent a necessary expense. 
As a result of the problems inherent in relying on public policy for the denial of 
deductions, the Congress endeavoured to codify the public policy set by judicial precedent 
so that it could form the basis of allowing and disallowing deductions238 . The statutory 
provision for the deduction of expenditure incurred in the production of income is found in 
section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code (to be referred to as the IRC). Section 162(a) of 
the IRC provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during a tax year in carrying on a trade or business. The section 
- -
was enacted to provide clearly defined grounds for disallowance as public policy does not 
always justify a denial of a deduction. Thus section 162 denies a business ex,peri'se 
deduction only if the expense falls under one of the specific public policy denial 
sections239. Deduction of the following expenses is denied: 
Illegal bribes, kickbacks and other payments240 
(1) Illegal payments to government officials or employees: 
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment made, directly or 
indirectly, to an official or employee of any government, or of any agency or 
instrumentality of any government, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback 
234 Carrie F Keller 'The Implications of I R C s 280E in Denying Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense 
Deductions to Drug Traffickers' (Winter, 2003) 47 Saint Louis University Law Journal 157 at 163. 
235 Commissioner v Sullivtm 356 U.S. 30 (1958) .' . 
236 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review273 
at 276 
237 Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v Commissioner 356 US. 30 (1958) 
238 Sharp 'Tax accounting for illegal activities' (2003) The National Public Accountant 1 
239 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 277 
240 Subsections 162 (c) of the IRC 
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or, if the payment is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment is 
unlawful under the foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 .... 
(2) Other illegal payments 
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment (other than a 
payment described in paragraph (1» made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if the 
payment constitutes an illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other illegal payment under any 
law of the United States, or under any law of a State (but only if such State-law is 
generally enforced), which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of licence 
or privilege to engage in trade or business. 
Denial of deduction for certain lobbying and political expenditures241 
(1) In general, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any 
amount paid or incurred in connection with -
(A) influencing legislation 
(B) participation in, or intervention in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office, 
(C) any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to 
elections, legislative matters, or referendums, or 
(D) any direct communication with a covered executive branch official in an attempt to 
influence the official actions or positions of such official. 
It would appear that these public policy denial provisions are similar to the prohibition in 
section 23(0) of the South African Income Tax Act and do not relate to expenditure 
incurred in respect of the illegal activities addressed in the present research, other than 
expenditure denied in terms of section 23(oi42. 
4.2.3 ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE 
In Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v Commissioner243, the taxpayer intentionally violated the 
weight limitations that applied to the trucking services and incurred a fine. In denying the 
deduction of the fine the court held that allowance of such fines as a deduction would 
encourage continued v.i.olation of state law and also be~ause such a fine was not necessary 
for the operation of the trucking business244. The IRe provides for the disallowance of a 
241 Subsection 162(e) of the IRC 
242 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 
243 Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v Commissioner 356 US. 30 (1958) 
244 Tank Truck Rentals Inc. v Commissioner 356 US. 30 (1958) at 35 
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deduction where the expenditure in question relates to a fine or a penaltl45. It is argued 
that allowing a deduction for fines imposed for the violation of laws and regulations would 
lessen the intended impact of the penalty,' as the government would be indirectly 
subsidising a portion of the guilty taxpayer's transgression246. For a fine to fall within the 
ambit of the prohibition, the fine must have been imposed upon and paid by the taxpayer 
attempting to deduct ie47 • The effect of this section is that a taxpayer who his been fined 
endures further punishment from tax law by being denied a deduction. It was held in 
Commissioner v Heininger248 that it is not the purpose of tax law to penalise illegal 
business by taxing gross income instead of net income. Nevertheless, if a taxpayer violates 
a law and a fine is imposed, that fine is not deductible even if such a violation occurred in 
the process of furtherance of the taxpayer's business or trade. 
Operational expenses inherent in all commercial enterprises have generally been allowed 
as deductions from the gross income of an illegal busines~249 ".;. The words "ordinary and 
necessary" refer to those expenses which are an integral part of a business, whether it is 
lawful or unlawful25o. In Reifel v Commissione?51 a deduction for payments made to 
witnesses for their testimonies in a lawsuit was denied on the grounds that such payments 
were not ordinary expenses. In G.A. Comeaux252 a deduction for salaries was allowed and 
emphasis was placed on the fact that these were expenses incurred in earning the income 
reported by the taxpayer. In Anthony Cornero Stralla253 it was held that expens.es . 
expended in the actual production of income were recognized as deductible. In Pittsburgh 
Milk Co254 the taxpayer company was in the business of retail and wholesale distribution 
245 Section 162(f) of the IRC 
246 Sharp 'Tax accounting for illegal activities' (2003) The National Public Accountant I 
247 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 282 -" 
248 Commissioner v Heininger 320 U.S. 467, 474 (1943) 
249 Landis Income "Tax Deductibility of Wages Paid by Employers Engaged in Illegal Activities, 
Bookmaking' (1956) California Law Review, 44 (4): 797-800 at 798 
250 Commissioner v Doyle 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956) 
251 Reffet v Commissioner 39 TC 869 (1963) 
252 G.A. Comeaux 10 T.c. 201 (1948) at 207 
253 Anthony Cornero Stralla 9 TC 80 I 82 I (I 947) 
254 Pittsburgh Milk Co, 26 TC 707, 717 (1956) 
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of milk. A price floor was set for the sale of milk and the taxpayer was illegally giving 
rebates to its customers in terms of contracts concluded between the taxpayer and its 
customers. The deduction from the gross inc-ome of the taxpayer of the amount of the 
rebates was disallowed by the Commissioner. The court held that a seller's illegal rebate 
was an exclusion, rather than a deduction item, and therefore necessarily outside the scope 
of the public policy doctrine. The law allows the deduction of a legltfm~te expense 
incurred by a taxpayer carrying on an illegal business255 • 
Case law indicates differing treatment of expenditure by taxpayers involved in illegal 
activities. The Tank Truck Rentals case held that fines are not deductible while the 
Sullivan and the Sam Mesi cases held that other expenses incurred in the production of 
income generated in an illegal manner are deductible. This means that taxpayers may be 
involved in illegal activities and the expenditure of one taxpayer will be allowed as a 
deduction and the expenditure of another taxpayer will be de!Jie4_Case law further implies 
that for expenditure to be deductible it must be ordinary or necessary for carrying on su~h 
a trade or business. Thieves and the perpetrators of fraud cannot efficiently and-effectively 
earn their income if they do not use equipment and labour in performing their duties. This 
means that, as the law stands, thieves can deduct such expenditure as it is necessary in 
order for them to earn their income. The denial of such expenditure leads to arbitrary 
results because paying tax on the gross income means an additional punishment. to-
taxpayers who have been punished under other laws, while other equally guilty taxpayers 
escape with no tax punishmerit256 . 
Colliton257 argues that the denial of a business expense deduction is neither an appropriate 
nor an effective way to punish wrongdoers and it is not consistent with the general purpose 
and structure of tax law. The sole purpose of tax law. is to collect revenue and provide 
-' . 
255 DeMattei "The Use of Taxation to Control Organized Crime"(1951) California Law Review, 39 (2): 226-
234 228 
256 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 278 
257 Colliton 'The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments' (1989) 9 Virginia Tax Review 273 
at 278 
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finance for government's budget. It is thus not for tax law to punish taxpayers for their bad 
behaviour that is not tax-related. 
It would appear that all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during a tax year 
in carrying on an illegal trade or business would be deductible, other than those 
specifically denied under the public policy denial sections. This provides- more certainty 
in relation to deductions, than the South African law provides. 
4.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In an old English case of Hayes v Duggan258 it was held that profits derived from running 
a sweepstake, being profits derived from a criminal enterprise, are not assessable to tax. 
The rationale for such a decision was said to be based on the construction that the State 
should not be seen to be benefiting from what it prohibits259 • Another reason for the non-
taxability of proceeds from illegal activities is becau~e g[ the moral or ethical 
interpretation used by courts that caused illegal activities to fall outside the definition pf 
trade260 • 
The approach to taxation of income from illegal activities changed to one where an 
amount is taxed only if it is derived from a trade. Once it has been established that an 
activity constitutes a trade, profits obtained from such a trade are taxable261 . Where-a-
taxpayer systematically engages in an illegal activity and the elements of a business are 
present, such as repetition, regularity, view to a profit and organisation, the proceeds from 
the activity have an income character262 . In other words once the character of a business 
has been ascertained as being of the nature of trade, the person who carries it on cannot 
found upon elements of illegality to avoid the tax263 . 
258 Hayes v Duggan [1929] 1 KB 752 at 758 
259 Mann v Nash (H M Inspector a/Taxes) [1932] 1 KB 752 at 758 
260 Jacobson The tax treatment a/illegal transactions (1986) 5 
261 Jacobson The tax treatment a/illegal transactions (1986) 4 
262 It's a fair cop [On line]. Available: 
http://w\vw.taxation.co.uk/Articles/2005104/07/49845/It·s+a+fair+cop.htm 
263 Minister 0/ Finance v Smith [1927] AC 193 
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The courts in the United Kingdom distinguish between two types of trade: legal and illegal 
trade. They also hold that proceeds will be taxed provided they arise from a trade, whether 
legal or illegal264 . Receipts from a systematic activity, where the elements of a business 
are present, are income for tax purposes irrespective of whether the activities are legal or 
illegal265 . The fact that the trade involves contractually unenforceable illegat acts does not, 
of itself, mean that the trading operations were beyond assessment to income tax266 • 
In Lindsay, Woodward and Hiscox v CIR267 it was held that the burglar and the swindler, 
who carryon a trade or business for profit, are as liable for tax as an honest business man. 
In Mann v Nash268, the appellant was an amusement caterer hiring out fruit machines, the 
use of which was at that time illegal. The question to be decided on by the court was 
whether the profits from these machines were subject to tax and the court held that there is 
no reason why receipts from letting machines in a commercial way with the aim of making 
a profit will not be a trade with taxable profits. In this case, the issue of the State 
" 
benefiting from illegal activities was addressed and it was further held that the State was 
not coming forward to take a share in the profits of unlawful gaming or condoning this 
practice, but it was merely attempting to tax individuals who receive income269 . Once the 
character of a business has been ascertained as being of the nature of trade, the person 
carrying on such a trade cannot avoid tax by arguing that the trade is illegal27o• 
In CIR v Aken271 the Commissioner sought to tax income earned through prostitution. The 
Commissioner in this case was able to prove that a trade was being carried on. It was 
264 CIR v Aken 63 TC 395 413G 
265 It's a fair cop [On line].-"Available: 
http://www.taxation.co.uk!ArticIesl2005/04/07/49845!It·s+a+fair+cop.htm 
266 Lindsay, Woodward & Hiscox v CIR 1933 SC 33 
267 Lindsay, Woodward & Hiscox v CIR 1933 SC 33 
268 Mann v Nash (HM Inspector o/Taxes) [1932] 1 KB 752 at 758 
269 Mann v Nash (H M Inspector o/Taxes) [1932] 1 KB 752 at 758 
270 Minister 0/ Finance v Smith [1927] AC 193 (PC) at 197 
271 CIR v Aken 63 TC 395 
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further held that if the activity is a trade, it is irrelevant for taxation purposes that it is 
illegaf72. 
Jacobson273 argues that if tax is chargeable when a legal trade is being carried on in an 
illegal manner or illegal transactions are entered into, then the same principles of taxation 
should apply where the trade is wholly illegal. 
4.3.1 DEDUCTIONS 
The respondent in CIR v Alexander von Glehn and Co Ltcf74 was sued for penalties in 
respect of alleged infringements of an Act in the course of its trade. The court held that the 
penalty and costs were not permissible deductions in arriving at the profits of the 
company's trade. In Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v FC of f275 the taxpayer was sued for 
the publication of a defamatory statement in its publications. When the amount of 
damages and the legal costs were claimed as a deduct~on}~e court held that such 
expenditure was wholly and exclusively laid out and expended for the production of 
,'. 
assessable income and was therefore deductible. Even though the taxpayer in the Herald 
and Weekly Times case could have continued to produce income by publishing non-
defamatory statements the court still allowed the deduction. It is submitted that incurring 
damages and legal costs is closely linked with the type of trade the taxpayer carried on and 
not really a penalty in the normal sense. The Telegraph276 reported that a Dutch col!I1 
allowed a bank robber to claim the cost of a pistol used during a robbery. The court in this 
case allowed the robber to -deduct from his gross income the cost of, the pistol on the 
grounds that criminal acts can be compared to normal business acts where money is spent 
in a quest to make more. In other words in this case the court did not look at the illegality 
of the act but looked at the expenditure incurred in the furtherance of the robber's trade. 
272 CIR v Aken 63 TC 395 405 F-H 
273 Jacobson The tax treatment of illegal transactions (1986) 3 
274 CIR v Alexander von Glehn and Co Ltd 12 TC 232 (CA) 
275 Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v FC ofT 48 CLR 113 
276 Rennie 'making crime pay' 2005 The Telegraph 27 January 
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4.3.2 ILLEGALITY IN A LEGAL TRADE 
If, in the course of trading, a taxpayer breaches the law and is fined, the fine is not 
. . 
connected to his business but such fine is imposed on the taxpayer personaIIy277. In CIR v 
E C Warnes & Co Ltci78 , it was held that a penal liability cannot be regarded as 
expenditure arising out of a trade as a loss connected to trade must be con!emplatable and 
must be in the nature of a commercial loss. Although prostitution is legal in the United 
Kingdom, prostitutes may incur illegal expenses when carrying on their trade. In CIR v 
Aken it was held that even though a prostitute is not legally allowed to incur expenditure 
on advertising, the rental of premises, employing people, forming a partnership or a 
company, the illegality of the activities which constitute a trade will not prevent it from 
being a trade. It would appear that such expenses, although incurred for illegal purposes, 
would qualify for deduction. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The taxing statute in the United States empowers the Commissioner to levy tax on i~cofue 
received by a taxpayer and does not make any provision for the exclusion of income from 
illegal activities. The law does allow deductions for expenditure incurred in the production 
of income but only if such expenditure is necessary. Expenditure on fines and penalties is, 
however, not deductible. 
In the United Kingdom, the law provides for the taxation of all inco~e derived from a 
trade, whether the trade is legal or illegal. Deductions are only allowed for expenditure 
that is legitimate, meaning expenditure inherent in that particular trade. The United 
Kingdom also does not allow for the deduction of penalties and fines. 
While there are similarities between the taxation of income from illegal activities in S8uth 
Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom, there appears to be more certainty in 
277 CIR v Alexander von Glehn and Co Ltd 12 TC 232 (CA) at 238 
278 CIR v E C Warnes & Co Ltd 12 TC 227 (KB) 231 
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the United States and the United Kingdom in relation to the deductibility of expenses 
incurred in earning the illegal income. 
74 
5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 TAXING ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This thesis has discussed the tax implications of receipts and accruals, as well as expenses, 
relating to illegal activities, with special emphasis on fraud, theft and prostitution. Income 
~ 
can be derived in two ways: through legal channels and through illegal channels. 
Regardless of how it was derived income should all be placed on an equal footing. 
Everyone should make their fair contribution to the fiscus by contributing according to 
what they have received or what accrued to them. The problem faced by the taxing 
authorities is the integrity of such systems in the public eye. If income from illegal 
activities is taxed, the public may not see that as the equal treatment of all income, but 
may interpret it as government condoning and benefiting from unlawful activities. The 
fisc us benefits from taxing crime and there is a pressing need for revenue in South Africa. 
Not taxing income from illegal activities will mean less money f1* the fiscus. On the other 
hand, if income from illegal activities is not taxed it would appear that criminals are aboye 
the law. If delinquent taxpayers were not taxed this would defeat the attempts to uproot 
crime, as this would amount to granting permission to set up illegal trades or income-
• ~. 279 
earnmg ventures so as to earn tax-lree mcome . Whether the same rationale should 
apply to the granting of deductions, is questionable. 
In South Africa, the Income Tax Act defines gross mcome as amounts, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to ot in favour of the taxpayer. This definition does not 
make any distinction between the legality and illegality of the source of such income. The 
Act merely requires the taxation of all income received by or accrued to a taxpayer. The 
first objective of the research was to analyze the taxability of receipts and accruals derived 
from illegal activitie; including the timing of a receipt and therefore the year of 
assessment in which the tax will be levied, given the remedies available to the victim of 
the crime. A thief, the perpetrator of fraud and a prostitute are all involved in illegal 
279 Minister of Finance v Smith [1927] AC 193 (PC) at 197 
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activities and in terms of the gross income definition what they earn is included in gross 
income. 
The question whether or not income from illegal activities is subject to tax was settled in 
1918 by the decision in CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co280. Bristowe, J stated that: 
I do not think it is material for the purposes of this case whether the business carried on 
by the company is legal or illegal. ... The source ofthe income is immaterial. 
Income received by or accrued to prostitutes, thieves and the perpetrators of fraud are 
subject to taxation, provided their income complies with the other provisions of the gross 
income definition. 
Before the decision in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARs281 settled the 
question, the courts had two choices in relation to including gains from theft or fraud in 
gross income: either to ignore the general principle that a potential obligation to repay the 
proceeds of theft or fraud or pay compensation to the victims is a condition which prevents 
the amounts from being received in the year of assessment in which the crime is 
committed, or to tax net income on the basis of readily realizable economic value282. In 
cases of theft and fraud the thieves or persons committing fraud do not acquire ownership 
of income or property received through their illegal trade. They can be sued and ordered 
to pay back all that was taken without the consent of the owner. This chance of being suea 
or ordered to restore the status quo could be viewed as a condition for. the accrual of 
income so received. In terms of South African law, income accrues to a taxpayer when all 
conditions have been fulfilled. If a condition still applies, such income cannot accrue. 
The gross income definition includes in its scope "amounts, in cash or otherwise", 
therefore encompassing both amounts in the form of ~~sh and the value of assets. South 
African law provides for the taxation of an amount on either receipt or accrual, whichever 
280 CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co 1918 TPD 391, 32 SATC 47 
281 MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141 
282 Monterio 'Money doesn't smell' (2005) Without Prejudice 5 (7) at 12-13. 
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occurs first. In cases of theft and fraud, thieves and persons committing fraud actually 
receive the cash or stolen goods. The decision in the MP Finance Group CC established 
the principle that the fact that such income may not accrue to taxpayers because it is 
subject to a condition, does not prevent the taxation of such income when it is received. 
The chance of being ordered to restore the status quo does not, therefore, prevent the 
taxation of the proceeds. If income was received for one's own benefit,~s-uch income is 
assessable to tax. 
Tax is not levied directly on gross income. A taxpayer must exclude exempt income and is 
allowed certain deductions in determining his or her tax liability. The second objective of 
the research was to analyse the deductibility of expenses incurred in the production of 
income from illegal activities. The preamble to section 11 and section II(a) of the Income 
Tax Act, together with section 23(t) and (g) (the general deduction formula), provide for 
the granting of deductions to taxpayers who are carrying on a trade. The definition of 
...... ,- -..:;....~ 
"trade" in section 1 of the Income Tax Act does not refer to legality or morality. Thus, as 
the South African law stands, one does not have to be carrying on a legal Of legitimate 
business to be carrying on a trade for tax purposes. Even though theft, fraud and 
prostitution are criminal activities, the facts of each case will determine whether these 
criminal activities constitute a trade. It is submitted that this reflects the law as it is. 
Section 11(a) provides certain requirements for expenditure to be deductible. The 
expenditure of taxpayers involved in- criminal activities may include ,various types of 
expenditure, including the purchase of capital equipment, repairs to such equipment, the 
payment of salaries, legal expenses and others. To qualify for deduction, the expenditure 
in question must, in addition to satisfying the "trade" requirement, must be incurred "in 
the production of inCOl]1e", that is, it must be be so clos~ly linked to the act giving rise to it 
that it can be regarded as part of the cost of performing it (Port Elizabeth Electric 
Tramways Company Ltd v CIR283). In Joffe and Co (Pty) Ltd v CIR284 the court referred to 
283 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Company Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241,8 SATC 13 
284 Joffe and Co (Ply) Ltd v CIR 13 SATC 354 
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expenses incurred bona fide for the purposes of trade. If, therefore, a criminal is carrying 
on a trade and incurs expenditure which meets the requirements of "in the production of 
income", as well as the other requirements of section I lea), the expenditure should be 
deductible. Expenditure of a capital nature would, however, not be deductible in terms of 
section I I (a), but may qualify in terms of other subsections of section I I. 
Being involved in illegal activities also carries the risk of being caught and thus fines (and 
imprisonment) can be held to be inherent in such trades. The Income Tax Act, in section 
23(0), specifically prohibits the deduction of fines and penalties. In other words the 
penalties imposed on a perpetrator of a crime, instead of imprisonment, would not be 
deductible even though they were incurred as a result of the production of income. 
In the case of fraud or theft, the stolen items to be returned to the victim or the 
compensation to be paid, depends on a case being brought against the taxpayer. This 
"amount" can therefore only be incurred in the year in whiCh tfie court order to return the 
stolen goods or to pay compensation is granted (CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltcf~\»or 
when the person voluntarily does so. If income was received by the taxpayer, he or she 
will be liable for tax as it formed part of his or her gross income. When the order to return 
the stolen property or to pay compensation is granted, the amount does not appear to meet 
the requirement of "in the production of income" in section I lea) of the Act (Port 
Elizabeth Electric Tramways Company Ltd v CIR286). In other words, when repaying ~~ . 
amount there is only an outflow of what was received earlier and there is no further inflow 
of any income as a result of the payment. Failure to meet any of the requirements in 
section I I (a), including the requirement that expenses must be incurred "in the production 
of income" leads to the denial of a deduction. 
285 CIR v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd, 55 SATC 198 
286 Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways Company Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241, 8 SATC 13 
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5.2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The final objective of the research was to present a brief comparison between the tax on 
illegal activities as levied in the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa. In 
the United States, gross income for taxation purposes refers to all income received 
whatever its source. The taxing statute empowers the Commissioner of T~t:xe; to levy tax 
on all income received by taxpayers regardless of its source. The mere fact that income is 
from an illegal source does not exempt such a receipt from tax. Criminals are taxed so that 
they cannot derive the full benefit of their misdeeds without paying what is due to the 
fiscus. 
Initially taxpayers who had a claim of right to the income they received in that particular 
year. of assessment were taxed on it. United States law then recognised the injustice 
brought about by the claim of right doctrine and an economic benefit doctrine was 
adopted. For an amount to be taxed the taxpayer must derive -an economic benefit from 
such income. 
The Constitution of the United States provides for the levy of tax on all income but does 
not make any provision for the allowance of deductions. It was thus left to the judiciary to 
decide on the deductions to be allowed and for many years this decision was taken on 
public policy considerations. In other words, a deduction was only allowed if it didIiot 
contravene public policy. Under this _ regime, expenditure incurred in the production of 
illegal income was not allowed as a deduction because allowing it would be inconsistent 
with public policy. 
Relying on public policy lead to inconsistency and uncertainty In law and Congress 
decided to enact a docluction section to avoid havin~ to rely directly on public policy. 
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the deduction of all ordinary and 
necessary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade. All ordinary expenses incurred, 
whether lawful or unlawful, are allowed as deductions as they are inherent in all 
commercial enterprises. In other words the law allows the deduction of legitimate 
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expenses incurred in carrying on an illegal trade. It is thus submitted that expenditure on 
equipment and salaries are deductible even if the taxpayer is carrying on an illegal trade. 
Fines and penalties on the other hand are not aeductible, even if they were incurred in the 
production of income. This disallowance is specifically provided for in the Internal 
Revenue Code. The situation in the United States with regard to the deduction of 
expenses incurred in carrying on an illegal trade is more certain than it is in South Africa. 
5.3 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Kennedy CJ in Hayes v Duggan287 posed the question whether the executive would keep 
its revenue eye open and vigilant and its eye of justice closed to crime, if the crime is 
untaxed. Thus in the United Kingdom tax is levied on all income derived from a trade. A 
trade can be legal or illegal. The rationale for taxing income from an iIlegal trade is that 
there is no reason why a receipt from any commercial act done with the object of making a 
profit should not be viewed as income from trade. By taxing t~ome from an illegal trade 
the Commissioner is not condoning the illegal trade but is taxing those who receive 
income. Fines are not deductible as they are viewed as not being connected to the 
taxpayer's business but are imposed on the taxpayer in his or her personal capacity. Other 
expenses incurred in the furtherance of an illegal trade are, however, deductible. 
5.4 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX DISCLOSURES"':-
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR-FURTHER RESEARCH 
The constitutionality of the requirement to disclose information to the Revenue 
Authorities, without providing for the rights of the taxpayer making the disclosure, is a 
topic for further research. The following discussion provides the rationale for this 
statement. 
For tax to be collected from taxpayers, the Commissioner issues income tax returns and a 
guide to help taxpayers when filling in tax returns. The guide, entitled Income Tax and the 
287 Hayes v Duggan [1929] 1 KB 752 
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Individual 200612007, states that every individual who receives income in excess of a 
specified amount is liable for income tax288 . This guide also includes a list of different 
types of income on which an individual can be taxed: all income from employment, 
income from business or trade, investment income, a pension, capital gains, etc289• It 
further specifies that individuals who receive income in excess of a certain amount and 
income from their own businesses must complete and submit a tax return to the South 
African Revenue Services290 . It is made clear that an individual may be liable for a fine or 
imprisonment if convicted of tax evasion, failure to complete a tax return or for failure to 
disclose all of his or her income in an income tax return291 . 
Section 75 of the Act provides, inter alia, that any person who fails to furnish, file or 
submit any return or document without just cause shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to 24 months. Section 75A 
empowers the Commissioner to publish for general information the name and address and 
. ~ 
other particulars of offenders and their offences, where such a taxpayer has been convicted 
for failure to furnish information in terms of section 75, section 104 and other sectigns" of 
the Income Tax Act. Section 104 provides that any person who, with intent to evade 
assessment or taxation, makes any false statement or entry in any return rendered in terms 
of the Act or gives any false answer to any request for information by the Commissioner 
or any person authorised by him shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a 
. - -
fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years. Persons involved in illegal 
activities submitting a tax return would therefore be aware of the potential penalties should 
they neglect to disclose fully any information required by the Commissioner. 
5.4.1 THE SECRECY PROVISIONS 
The Income Tax Act-empowers the Commissioner to ~~port to the Commissioner of Police 
when he or she (the Commissioner for Inland Revenue) suspects that an offence, other 
288 Income Tax and the Individual 2006/2007 1. 
289 Income Tax and the Individual 2006/2007 1. 
290 Income Tax and the Individual 2006/2007 1. 
291 Income Tax and the Individual 2006/2007 8. 
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than a revenue related offence, has been committed292 . Section 4 of the Income Tax Act 
provides as follows: 
-< 
(1) Every person employed or engaged by the Commissioner in carrying out the 
provisions of this Act shall preserve and aid in preserving secrecy with regard to all 
that may come to his or her knowledge in the performance of his or her puties in 
connection with those provisions, and shall not communicate any such matter to any 
person whatsoever, other than the taxpayer concerned ... 
The purpose of the preservation of secrecy provisions in the Act is to encourage full 
disclosure and to obtain and retain the confidence of the person supplying the necessary 
information293 . 
Section 4(1B) of the Act, on the other hand, provides that the Commissioner may ex parte 
apply for an order allowing him or her to disclose to the National Commissioner of the 
South African Police Services information which may reveal evidence: 
(a) that an offence other than an offence in terms of the Act or any Act administered 
by the Commissioner or any other offence in respect of which the Commissioner is a 
complainant has been or may be committed, or where such information may be relevant 
to the investigation or prosecution of such offence in respect of which a court may 
impose a sentence of imprisonment exceeding five years; or 
(b) of an imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk ... 
The Act further provides in section 4(1B) that the Commissioner can also apply for such 
an order where public interest in the disclosure of such information outweighs any 
potential harm to the taxpayer concerned should such information be disclosed. 
Provided that any information, document or thing provided by a taxpayer in any return 
or document, or obtained from a taxpayer in terms of section 74A, 74B or 74C, which 
292 Section 4(1 B) ofthe Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
293 Union Government v Shiu 1955 (1) SA 298 (T) 300. 
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is disclosed in terms of this subsection, shall not, unless a competent court otherwise 
directs, be admissible in any criminal proceedings against such taxpayer, to the extent 
that such information, document or thing constitutes an admission by such taxpayer of 
< • 
the commission of an offence contemplated in paragraph (a). 
Although section 4( 1) of the Act provides for secrecy, the Commissioner may disclose 
information under certain circumstances which may, if directed by a competent court, be 
admissible in criminal proceedings. Compliance with the requirements of the Act may 
render a person engaged in illegal activities vulnerable to criminal proceedings relating to 
the activities themselves. 
Taxing fraudulently received money and stolen money, as well as income derived from 
prostitution, therefore has implications other than tax implications. 
The income tax return to be submitted by taxpayers carrying c.On a business requires the 
taxpayer to disclose the nature of the business carried on and to select an appropriate cQ,de 
for the classification of the business. Under, for example, the section for retail trade, a 
code number is provided for a category called "other". It may not be necessary at that 
stage to disclose the exact nature of the income and therefore the fact that it arises from an 
illegal activity. The problem will arise, however, should the person be required to furnish 
further particulars. 
Section 74A294 provides as follows: 
Furnishing of information, documents or things by any person -
The Commissioner or any officer may, for the purposes of the administration of this Act 
in relation to any taxpayer, require- such taxpayer or any other person to furnish such 
information (whether orally or in writing), documents or things as the Commissioner or 
-' 
such officer may require. 
294 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 
83 
Section 74B295 makes provision for obtaining the information, documents or things either 
by requiring the taxpayer or any other person to furnish them for the purposes of inspecting 
them, auditing them, examining them or obtainihg them, or by visiting any person at any 
premises during that person's normal business hours. It is at this stage that the problem of 
secrecy may arise. 
5.4.2 PRIVILEGE AND SELF-INCRIMINATION 
In terms of the law of evidence, a privilege comes into operation in terms of which a 
witness is not obliged to answer a question or to supply information that is relevant to a 
matter before court296. A witness is thus said to be privileged when he or she may validly 
refuse to answer a question or to supply information which would be relevant to the 
determination of an issue in judicial proceedings297. The right to claim such a privilege 
can be waived298 . 
The privilege against self incrimination prohibits a person from being compelled to g!ye 
evidence that incriminates him or her299. It operates as a shield against an obligation of 
compulsory disclosure30o• Taxpayers are not informed of this shield when they are 
completing tax returns and some taxpayers may end up disclosing income that the 
Commissioner may suspect was obtained from illegal activities and this information may 
then be used to build a criminal case against such taxpayer. In other words, a taxpayer may. 
incriminate himself or herself in a tax return and such information may be made available 
to the South African Police to aid them in their investigations.' An investigatory 
mechanism may not, however, be used to build up a case against the examinee, by forcing 
him or her to speak and disclose information which is then used to find more evidence 
295 Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 
296 Schwikard Principles of evidence 2 ed (2002) 115. 
297 Tapper Cross and Taper on evidence 9 ed (1999) 420. 
298 Schwikard Principles of evidence 2 ed (2002) 116. 
299 R v Comane 1925 AD 570 575. 
300 Tapper Cross and Taper on evidence 9t ed (1999) 424. 
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against such person30I . The rationale for the right not to give self-incriminating evidence is 
to encourage accused persons to testify freely302. A taxpayer would, however, not readily 
refuse to answer questions in a tax return, becituse of the consequences of failure to do so, 
of which a taxpayer is informed. 
The privilege against self incrimination is a common law principle r but it is now 
constitutionally protected. The Constitution provides that an accused, detained and 
arrested person has a right not to be compelled to make a confession or to give self-
incriminating evidence. In S v Lotterinio3, a case decided after the coming into operation 
of the Constitution, the accused made an admission without being warned of his 
constitutional right to remain silent and the right to legal representation. The court held 
that as there were no threats or intimidation and no force used, he acted voluntarily304. It 
is submitted that a taxpayer does not act voluntarily when filling in a tax return, taking into 
account the fact that the Commissioner is empowered to pybJi§.h. names of offenders and 
that failure to complete a tax return fully and honestly may result in a conviction a.~d 
imposition of fines or imprisonment. 
A taxpayer has no one to advise him or her of the consequences of answering or not 
answering a question on a tax return or responding to a request for information by the 
Commissioner and, because of this, taxpayers may incriminate themselves. 
5.4.3 CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TOINFORM A PERSON qF HIS OR HER 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The Constitution introduced section 35(5), which provides that evidence obtained in a 
manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of 
such evidence would -render the trial unfair or would he. detrimental to the administration 
301 Brucwe" A duty to answer questions? The Police, the Independent Complaints Directorate and the right 
to remain silent' (2000) 16 (1) SAJHR 7l. 
302 Schwikard Principles of evidence 2 ed (2002) 117. 
303 S v Lottering 1999 12 BCLR 1478. 
304 S v Lotterind 1483 E. 
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of justice process. The presence or absence of prejudice to the accused as well as the 
nature and degree thereof, has an impact on the question of whether or not to exclude the 
evidence in the interests of ensuring a fair triaP05. It is submitted that the disclosures 
required of taxpayers earning income from illegal activities would be extremely 
prejudicial and that such evidence should be inadmissible against an accused taxpayer. 
The evidence is obtained under duress and the taxpayer is not warned of the right to 
remain silent - that is, taxpayers are not warned of the potential use of such disclosures as 
evidence in a criminal trial. 
The Constitutional Court, in Bernstein v Bester Ndo6, held that evidence obtained under 
compulsion may not be used in subsequent civil proceedings against a person. South 
African law recognises two factors that can affect the voluntariness of an admission: they 
are a threat or a promise from a person in authority. A liberal meaning of a person in 
authority was given in S v Robertson en andere307 where- it cWas held that a person in 
authority is anyone who exercises a degree of authority over the accused, whether or not 
she or he occupies an official position. This interpretation is wide enough to include the 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services or a duly appointed official. 
When criminals in the United States were charged with revenue crimes, including tax 
evasion and failure to file a tax return, the right against giving self-incriminating . 
information guaranteed in criminal law could not be used as a defence as a taxpayer could 
object to the use of such information at the stage of filing of a tax' return308. It was 
assumed that if one discloses information in the tax return without objecting to it being 
utilised to formulate a subsequent criminal case, that such information was supplied 
voluntarillo9 . In other words when- it came to disclosing income the right not to 
incriminate oneself dill not apply if the taxpayer did not lodge an objection to subsequent 
305 S v Sod 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E) 293-294_ 
306 Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC); 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) paras 107-123 .. 
307 S v Robertson en andere 1981 (1) SA 460 (A). 
308 United States v Sullivan 177 F .ad 607, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1940) at 263 
309 United States v Sullivan 177 F.ad 607,617-18 (9th Cir. 1940) 
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use of such information. The case of Garner v United States310 brought about a change in 
the treatment of information disclosed in a tax return with regard to subsequent non-tax 
prosecutions. The taxpayer in Garner v United States was a gambler and he disclosed this 
fact in his income tax return and he was prosecuted for contravening gambling laws. The 
court held that admitting in his tax return that he was a gambler amounted to self-
incrimination and affected his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. It was 
further held that the taxpayer was not effectively given the opportunity to assert his 
privilege either by not filing a tax return or refusing to supply the incriminating 
information and that he was entitled to use his right with regard to non-tax prosecution. It 
was further held in Garner v United States that for taxpayers to effectively waive a 
privilege they must be aware of its existence and waive it voluntarily and knowing the 
implications of such a waiver. The rationale for requiring a taxpayer to honestly fill in a 
tax return is based on the fact that revenue laws are not intended to tax income from legal 
sources only, but to tax all income derived by the taxpayer31!.- ",.~ 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
To a layman, the taxation of income from illegal activities may appear to be unethical and 
it may also appear that the Revenue authorities or government are condoning and 
benefiting from crime312 . This taboo on the government taxing income from illegal 
activities stems from the fact that some people do not believe that it is possible to extract -
legal tax from illegal income. By contrast, one writer has given the title 'money does not 
smell' to her article and it is submitted that this is based on the view that South African tax 
law is rightfully claiming what is due to the fisc us. The notion of government benefiting 
from crime is inevitable. In addition, Value-Added Tax is levied on most goods and 
services provided in South Africa and the source of the money used to pay the Value-
-' 
Added Tax is not relevant. 
310 Garner v United States 71-1219 (9th Cir., June 5, 1972) 
3ll 1973. 'Constitutional Law. Self-Incrimination. Use ofInformation Provided without Objection on Income 
Tax Return Prohibited in Prosecution for Nontax Offence. Garner v. United States, No. 71-1219 (9th 
Cir., June 5,1972)" Harvard Law Review, 86 (5): 914-922 at 916 
312 T.H.B. Jr. "Income Tax Consequences of theft" (1949) 25(6) Virginia Law Review 759-773759 
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To summarise, South Africa needs funds to finance the government's budget. In terms of 
South African law income, regardless of its nature, is taxable. If criminals are taxed they 
are contributing their share to the fiscus and, if they are not taxed, this appears to be 
condoning criminal activities. The disallowance of deductions on the basis of the 
expenditure not being incurred in the production of (illegal) income leads to an 
unjustifiable differential treatment of taxpayers. There are other ways of punishing 
wrongdoers and tax laws should put all income on an equal footing and not differentiate 
between taxpayers when it comes to allowing deductions. Government agencies are tasked 
with different duties, but they work hand in hand in order to achieve the same goal of a 
better society for all. If the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services does 
not disclose the information about suspected crimes then the law enforcement branch 
suffers and the Commissioner would appear to be assisting criminals to avoid justice. If 
the Commissioner discloses such information, on the other_ haud. a taxpayer is prejudiced 
and his or her constitutional rights may be infringed. 
It appears that court decisions have provided certainty regarding the taxation of income 
derived from illegal activities. The question of the deductibility of expenses incurred in 
producing this income also appears to be fairly certain. A grey area, however, is the 
deductibility of compensation or restitution that the criminal would have to make, if his or 
her crime is discovered. 
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